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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)G) (2011). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court correctly determine that a subsequent purchaser for value of 
real property is protected against a claim that a second-in-time recorded trust deed 
is senior in priority, notwithstanding the order of recording, to an earlier recorded 
trust deed from which the purchaser's chain of title originates, under a common 
law rule that confers priority in certain instances on purchase money mortgages? 
A district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. See 
Harvey v. Cedar Hills City, 2010 UT 12, f 10, 127 P.3d 256 (citation omitted). This 
issue was raised below. See [R. 320-40.] 
2. Does the Purchase Money Rule apply in the instant case where there is no 
evidence the third-party purchase money lender knew of the sellers5 trust deed? 
A district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. See 
Harvey, 2010 UT 12, ^ f 10. This Court may affirm a grant of summary judgment upon 
any grounds apparent in the record. See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, % 10, 52 P.3d 
1158. This issue was raised below. See Memorandum in Support of Homero Farias' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [R. 335-37.] 
3. Are Insight Assets' claims barred by the doctrine of laches where it, and its 
predecessor in interest, waited over four years to commence a lawsuit and 
numerous parties detrimentally relied on the priority of the trust deeds established 
by the order of recording? 
A district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. See 
Harvey, 2010 UT 12, <|[ 10. This Court may affirm a grant of summary judgment upon 
any grounds apparent in the record. See Bailey, 2002 UT 58, \ 10. This issue was raised 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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below. See Memorandum in Support of Homero Farias' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment [R. 337-39.] 
4. Did the district court err by refusing to grant Appellee Homero Farias' request for 
attorney fees under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826, on the basis that Farias was 
not an original party to the contracts, even though the litigation was based upon a 
written contract which allowed one party to the litigation to recover attorney fees? 
A district court's interpretation of a statute is reviewed for correctness. See 
Hooban v. Unicity Intern., Inc., 2009 UT App 267, If 7, 220 P.3d 485. '"Correctness' 
means the appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to 
the trial judge's determination of law." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) 
(citations omitted). This issue was raised below. See Memorandum in Support of 
Homero Farias' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, at p. 20 [R. 339]; Ruling [R. 
573.] A copy of the Ruling is included in the Addendum hereto as Tab "A." 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following provisions are determinative of the above-captioned appeal: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-3-103 (2011): 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any 
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a 
valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 
A copy of section 57-3-103 of the Utah Code is included in the Addendum hereto at Tab 
"B." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826 (2011): 
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a 
civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party 
to recover attorney fees. 
A copy of Section 78B-5-826 of the Utah Code is included in the Addendum 
hereto at Tab "C." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal arising from a grant of summary judgment on a quiet title 
counterclaim brought by Appellee Homero Farias ("Farias") concerning real property 
located in Weber County. Farias is the current owner of record of the property, and has 
owned the property since 2007. Appellant Insight Assets, Inc. ("Insight Assets") asserts 
that it has an interest in the property under a trust deed that was executed in 2004, and 
brought a judicial foreclosure proceeding against the property. 
The trust deed under which Insight Assets asserts its alleged interest, however, 
was recorded in a second position behind a trust deed given to a third-party lender who 
provided the bulk of the financing for the purchase of the property. The third-party 
lender's trust deed was subsequently foreclosed and, under Utah law, extinguished any 
junior liens and encumbrances, including the later-recorded trust deed claimed by Insight 
Assets. Indeed, since the foreclosure, numerous conveyances of the property have 
occurred with the parties relying on this fact in purchasing the property, including Farias. 
Insight Assets claims that the trust deed under which it claims an interest was not 
extinguished because it was actually senior to the third-party lender's trust deed under a 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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common law rule ni priority that confers priority on a seller 's purchase ;HOIH > . r u - ^..m 
mill. \ n-rfar. ei.i nin-.iaiuc . : ... -- ne.i ..i ;-. acre (the "Purchase Money Rule"). 
Insight Assets ' claim la iK lu>\vc\ u \ lor several reasons. First, tlle law affords 
protection to subsequent piirehasers ol u. ,*; property who take an mteresi in rcai property 
will: 101 it acti lal c i c 01 isti i icti ve r IC tic :e oi \ u iki: 10^  vi i claii i: is ai id ii iterests ii i real pi opei !:> 
Farias satisfies all the requirements of this defense, and thus takes free of any claim by 
Insight Assets that its trust deed remains an encumbrance on the property. Moreovei , the 
Pin c J lase IVloi le y R 1 ik does i lot apply it i : ases \ 1 ici e tl 1 : f irst recorded lendei did i ic I 
know that the seller retained an interest in the nroperi\ Hn;i!l\ Insight Assets ' claim is 
barred by the doctrine of laches where it (and its assignor) waited over four years to raise 
tilt iiisiani Ciaii.i. ,HKI several panics na \ e rci: . ;;u ; . \ : . ! ! . j i r >Mri.'.oi>! •• v- i 
r e i K ^ i e ^ e - ;,
 i{-., . -,-•- i, i -.i . ie foreclosure ui ihe earlier-recorded lender 's 
trissi deed, in conveying the nmperh . 
II. C O U R S E O F P R O C E E D I N G S A N D DISPOSITION B E L O W 
I n s i g h t A s s e t s Mied Iv i i i . r . in II- ! • • •••• ^ ' h * l 'i -rn I I mid i and li»r Weber 
County on November 19, 2009. See Complaii M h" I ••*<• Specifically, Insight Assets 
asserted claims for declaratory relief and /// /v.'// judicial foreclosures. See id. ! anas 
answered the Con lplaii it ai id bi on lgl it Coi u: iterclain is agaii ist Ii isigl it \ s se ts ai id y ,/V 
Andrew McCul lough for quiet title, slander of title, and wrongful lien. See Answer and 
Counterclaim [R. 47-60.] 
I n s i g h t / \ > - C i s • i : t ' . \ u l * • .: s-.-i . JL' Hi • I =lia'- r - M • h p : . . j ' 0 , 
Among other things, Insight Assets sought a determination that the trust deed it acquired 
A Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was a vendor purchase money mortgage, that it had priority over a prior recorded trust 
deed, and that its trust deed still validly encumbered the Property. See Insight Assets' 
Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 80-90.] Farias opposed Insight Assets' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment seeking a 
determination that Farias was a bona fide purchaser for value and that he took free and 
clear of any alleged interest Insight Assets had under the Phalen Trust Deed. See 
Memorandum in Support of Homero Farias' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [R. 
329-35.] Farias also sought summary judgment on the basis that the vendor purchase 
money rule did not apply and that Insight Assets' claims were barred by the doctrine of 
laches. See id. [R. 335-39.] 
After full briefing, and oral argument, the district court denied Insight Assets' 
motion for summary judgment and granted Farias' cross-motion for summary judgment 
relating to Farias' quiet title claim. See Ruling, Tab A [R. 573-79.] The district court, 
however, denied Farias' request for attorney fees. See id. [R. 578.] The parties stipulated 
to a dismissal of Farias' remaining claims for slander of title and wrongful lien. See 
Stipulated Motion for Order of Dismissal with Prejudice of Counts II and III of Farias' 
Counterclaim [R. 582-83.] The district court dismissed counts II and III and entered final 
judgment on December 14, 2010. See Final Judgment and Order [R. 601-04.] A copy of 
the Final Judgment and Order is included in the Addendum hereto at Tab "D." Insight 
Assets appealed. See Notice of Appeal [R. 599-600.] Farias cross appealed. See Notice 
of Cross-Appeal [R. 605-07.] 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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i n . S T A T E M E N T O F FAC I 'S 
B-'-ih s-;i: ia- and Insight Assets claim an interest in real properly in Weber Count) , 
located at 2915 Madison Avenue, Ogden, I Itali 8440" (die "Properly"), the legal 
description oi uh;Ui - a-- lu .^ws : 
PARI uv LOL J , LSJLUUK ,. M , . . . . uuDhiN bURVLY, WEBER 
COUNTY, UTAH, AND PART Ok VACATED PORTION OF 
MADISON AVENUE DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: BEGINNING A I ' A 
POIN r 400 FEET NORTH OI i HE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF LOT 2, 
BLOCK 4, AND RUNNING THENCE WEST 75 FEET, THENCE 
NORTH 50 FEET, THENCE EAST 94.5 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 50 
FEET, THENCE WEST 10.5 FFFT TO THE PI ACE OF BEGINNING. 
Situated ill WEBER County 
Parcel Identification Number: 04-032-0022 
In 2004 Toscph and Denise Phalen * tu "Phalci. • • • -- the owners of the 
Pr< >p< :;rt)/ S*<. *\ . t " . r - * •• • 'i«.»i •• [ R 352 ] Oi • : it > : i : .1 
March 4, 2004, the Phalens and William and Roberta Boeck (the "Boecks") entered into a 
Real Estate Purchase Contract for the sale of the Property. See Real Estate Purchase 
Coi ltract [R 37 i 8 1 ]:; Depositioi i of Josepl 11 J!i lalei i, 13 i 1 j R 358 ] I i le parties agi eed 
on a purchase price of $88,000, which would be financed through a "conventional loan'" 
in (lie amount of $~0„100, a $100 earnest money deposit, and the remaining $17,600 
woi ild be provided tl n oi igl I sellei fii lat icing 1:>;> 1:1 le I I. miens Si *e R eal Estate I >i it cl lase 
Contract [R. 374.] 
The Phalens knew that the Boecks were obtaining a conventional loan to finance 
the purchase oi ihc I'mperty and that said loan would be secured w ith a mortgage. fhe 
Phalens never 1 lad ai iy coi i n i n u licatioi is 1li \ itl: I tl le Boecks' lei ider, I <irst I Tai lklh 11 'ii lai ic ial 
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Corporation ("FFFC"). See Joseph Depo, 16:14-23, 20:16-20 [R. 358-59]; Denise 
Depo., 20:9-16, 21:11-17, 23:17-19[R. 368-69.] Mr. Phalen understood that, because 
FFFC was providing the bulk of the financing for the purchase of the Property, FFFC 
would be paid first from any foreclosure sale of the Property. See Joseph Depo., 21:16-
22:3 [R. 360.] Indeed, Mr. Phalen did not believe FFFC would have provided a loan to 
the Boecks to purchase the Property if it was not going to be paid first from any 
foreclosure sale. See Joseph Depo., 22:4-14 [R. 360.] With this understanding, Mr. 
Phalen was agreeable to going forward with the sale of the Property. See Joseph Depo., 
21:16—22:17 [R. 360.] 
At the closing of the sale, which occurred on or about April 19, 2004, the Phalens 
executed a Warranty Deed to convey the Property to the Boecks. See Warranty Deed [R. 
354.] A copy of the Warranty Deed is included in the Addendum hereto at Tab "E." The 
Boecks executed a Deed of Trust naming FFFC as beneficiary (the "FFFC Trust Deed"), 
which trust deed covered the Property and secured repayment of the $72,000 
conventional loan provided by FFFC to the Boecks. See FFFC Trust Deed [R. 386-402.] 
A copy of the FFFC Trust Deed is included in the Addendum hereto at Tab "F." 
Additionally, the Boecks executed a Trust Deed Note to evidence the seller financing, in 
the principal amount of $17,600, which note was secured by a Trust Deed with the 
Phalens as beneficiaries (the "Phalen Trust Deed"). See Trust Deed Note [R. 404]; 
Phalen Trust Deed [R. 345-48.] A copy of the Phalen Trust Deed is included in the 
Addendum hereto at Tab "G." The Trust Deed Note provides for an award of attorney 
fees to the holder of the Trust Deed Note "if this note is collected by an attorney after 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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deiauii jii ihe payment ui pnri'jjjai i>r !."i' - ' : -"M J *.N .iw .i, ,, u-,e 
undersigi ied, tt \ istors joii illy ai id severally agree ic \xw all costs and expenses of 
collectioi1 including a reasonable attorneys' fee." [K. -Ui\.] The Phaleti Trust Deed 
further pro\ ules lor an award ol attorney fees: 
[ujpoi 1 the occurrence of any deiault hereunder, Beneficiary shall nave die 
option to declare all sums secured hereby immediately due and payable and 
foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided b\ law for the foreclosure 
of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in 
such proceeding all en-K ano expenses incideni (hereto, including a 
reasonable attorney's lee HI such :tmount a^  h^aH ho h\cd by the coiirt 
\U M 7 | 
At the time of closing, the Phalens had a mortgage on ihe Property in the 
approximate amount of $47,000 through Washington Mutual liank w Inch was paid oil 
oi it c f the pi ot . ,f ?i r _l ^ ' •• • • < : •• ^ " v » * < ^ -• > I . 
360]; Denise Depo., 24:1 i 13, 25:10 1^  [R. 369- 7U.J Additional!), die Phalens received 
a cash payment from the sale of the Property in the anient of approximately $14,000. 
Sei ^ c n i i i n;po • 1^ . \ ''^ -'"ni s • , : > HI,-* • I • - • • ;-- - j 
j n concluding the closing on the sale of the Property, the following instruments 
were recorded wit! I the Weber County Recorder on April 22, 2004, by FFFC and the 
Phalens5 escrow agent, I I.S. I lile of I Jtal i. it i tl ic follo\ vii lg 3ii::ler: 
• I ' T V ' . I ; - ! • -1 ! i : ' ' / ' • ' •' " 0 0 4 . iM;- !K !1 « k M M n P - J i c o KS, w a s 
recorded first as Entry No. 2026212 [R. 354]; 
• The FFFC Trust Deed, dated April 19, 2004, was recorded next as Entry No. 
2026213 [R 386 102]; J n id 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
• The Phalen Trust Deed, dated April 19, 2004, was recorded last as Entry No. 
2026214 [R. 345-48.] 
The FFFC Trust Deed was subsequently assigned to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 
("Wells Fargo"), with notice of said assignment being recorded on December 23, 2004. 
See Corporate Assignment of Deed of Trust [R. 406-07.] Shortly after the closing, the 
Boecks defaulted on their obligations under the FFFC Loan, and a "Substitution of 
Trustee" and a "Notice of Default" were recorded. [R. 408-11.] Likewise, immediately 
after the closing, the Boecks defaulted on their obligations under the Trust Deed Note by 
failing to make any payments to the Phalens. See Joseph Depo., 44:6-9 [R. 363.] 
On or about June 7, 2005, Wells Fargo foreclosed on the Property pursuant to the 
FFFC Trust Deed, and a Trustee's Deed was executed on June 14, 2005, conveying the 
Property to Wells Fargo, and said deed was recorded on the same date with the Weber 
County Recorder as Entry No. 2109270. See Trustee's Deed [R. 413-14.] The Phalens 
never attempted to foreclose on the Property under the Phalen Trust Deed. See Denise 
Depo., 33:23-25 [R. 371.] 
Following the foreclosure of the FFFC Trust Deed, Wells Fargo conveyed the 
Property to TTR Holdings, LLC by way of Special Warranty Deed, recorded with the 
Weber County Recorder on November 18, 2005. See Special Warranty Deed [R. 416-
18.] TTR Holdings then conveyed the Property to Alan H. Reisert by way of Warranty 
Deed, recorded with the Weber County Recorder on February 27, 2006. [R. 327.] 
Finally, Alan Reisert conveyed the Property to Farias by way of Warranty Deed, recorded 
with the Weber County Recorder on August 17, 2007. See Warranty Deed [R. 342.] 
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Tanas is the current owner of record of 1 he Property. A t tl i.e til i ic lie acquired tl u :: 
I'nhn.Th l;ari;t. !..uJ no :.eiuai knowledge of the existence of the Phalen Trust Deed, or 
any existing liens or encumbrances on tl ic Property, including any lien, encumbrance, or 
claim arising under the Phak n ; r:isi 1 •-* . >. .Ve I Jcclaraiioii oi I iomen i-an^ ** • •
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On or about August 27, 2009, the Phalens purportedly assigned their interest in the 
Phalen Trust Deed and the Trust Deed Note to Insight .Assets for $500. See Assignment 
( >f I • : i istDee< 1 [R 350] ; Dei rise Dt :pc > 38:25 39:21 [R 3 ; ' 2 ] ; J< >: >eph D e p o
 : 3 1:11 25[R 
362.] Insight Assets subsequ^'i * y caused a substitution of trustee to be recorded on 
August 31, 2009, purportedly appointing W Andrew McCullough ("McCullough") as 
successor trustee asiuer uw J':J;.:. .. r J • - -s : oe | \ * I-
s a i r r d r - \ * . •• i; h ' - u >••. r,\ ihi' uueii liu^L D e e d , recorded .: 
notice of default, stating ihai i default in the ! rust Deed Note had occurred and that 
Insight Assets had elected lo ->ell the property to satis 1\ the amounts owed micki lU \ rust 
Deed Note, . . . • ; - :! attoi i i.e >< fees ae» M: 
Default [R. 423.] McCullough subsequently recorded a corrected notice of dealt. See 
Corrected Notice of Default [R. 424.] This lawsuit ensued. 
iv. RESPONSE i n INSIMIT VSSK rs- ST \TVI\\V IN I OV KM rs 
Several of Insight Assets' "facts" are unsupported by any record evidence. For 
example, Insight Assets asserts that "First Franklin and the Phalens knew they were each 
l i l U i ! U i i L : a
 ;
: o - :• ' . i t .-i". p e r i'. a i u j • i: l\V !.- . . l lIc '•: < . . , ' • J M J U , ; - p i ' . . - ! * . . 
at p. 5. Insight Assets, however, cites no evidence to support this proposition. Instead, 
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Insight Assets merely cites to its legal argument concerning the imputation of knowledge 
of the escrow officer to FFFC. As set forth in the Argument section below, this legal 
argument is incorrect. There was no evidence submitted to the district court regarding 
FFFC's knowledge of the Phalen Trust Deed. 
Insight Assets further alleges that the FFFC Trust Deed and the Phalen Trust Deed 
were recorded simultaneously with the other documents reflecting the sale. See Brief of 
Appellant, at p. 5. Insight Assets misconstrues the evidence of the order of recording. 
Although the documents were recorded consecutively on April 22, 2004, they were not 
recorded simultaneously. The Warranty Deed to the Boecks was recorded first as Entry 
No. 2026212 [R. 354]; the FFFC Trust Deed was recorded second as Entry No. 2026213 
[R. 386-402]; and the Phalen Trust Deed was recorded last as Entry No. 2026214 [R. 
345-48.] 
Insight Assets also states that the Phalen Trust Deed was never reconveyed and 
that the records kept by the Weber County Recorder still show the Phalen Trust Deed 
encumbering the Property. See Brief of Appellant, at p. 6. What the records of the 
Weber County Recorder show, and the effects thereof, is a legal determination not a 
statement of fact. In any event, the fact that the Recorder's records show all documents 
that have been recorded does not support the legal conclusion that a trust deed still 
encumbers property. Furthermore, the citations to the record provided by Insight Assets 
do not relate to, or support, this "factual" allegation. 
Finally, Insight Assets misstates the holding of the district court and the grounds 
for its granting summary judgment in favor of Farias. Insight Assets claims that "[t]he 
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district court found that the Phalen Trust Deed was a vendor purchase money mortgage, 
but that its priority as a vendor purchase money mortgage was eviscerated by Utah's 
Recording Statute, and therefore junior to the extinguished First Franklin Trust Deed." 
Appellant's Brief, at p. 6. The district court did not rule on the priority of the Phalen 
Trust Deed vis-a-vis the FFFC Trust Deed.1 Rather the district court found that 
regardless of the priority between the FFFC Trust Deed and the Phalen Trust Deed, 
Farias took ownership of the Property, as a bona fide purchaser for value, free and clear 
of any alleged claim that Insight Assets had in the Property pursuant to the Phalen Trust 
Deed or otherwise. [R. 577-78.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Argument I; The main issue presented in this case is whether a party like Insight 
Assets can invoke the Purchase Money Rule years later to the detriment of subsequent 
purchasers for value who have no notice that a seller trust deed given several years ago 
continues to encumber real property notwithstanding a foreclosure of an earlier recorded 
trust deed, which extinguished the seller trust deed barring some legal claim to the 
contrary. Farias had no knowledge of the Phalen Trust Deed when he acquired the 
Property in 2007. Subsequent to his purchase of the Property, Insight Assets has now 
come forth and is seeking to foreclose on the Property to satisfy the unpaid amount owed 
under the Trust Deed Note (an instrument to which Farias is not a party). Insight Assets 
1
 Farias argued below that the FFFC Trust Deed had priority over the Phalen Trust Deed 
because the Purchase Money Rule did not apply. The district court, however, did not 
reach this issue, instead relying of Farias5 status as a bona fide purchaser. Farias again 
presents the argument that the FFFC Trust Deed had priority over the Phalen Trust Deed 
as an additional ground to affirm the district court's ruling. See infra Section II. 
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claims to be the beneficiary under the Phalen Trust Deed, and argues the trust deed was 
not extinguished by foreclosure of the earlier-recorded FFFC Trust Deed due to the 
operation of the Purchase Money Rule. Insight Assets incorrectly takes the position that 
the Purchase Money Rule is an immutable, absolute rule that operates to the exclusion of 
recording acts and to the detriment of subsequent bona fide purchasers. 
For reasons explained herein, the district court correctly ruled that the Purchase 
Money Rule is not absolute and that it is subject to the operation of recording acts and the 
bona fide purchaser for value defense (the "BFP Defense"). Insight Assets is unable to 
cite to, and Farias is unaware of, any articulation of the Purchase Money Rule that 
indicates it vitiates the effect of recording acts and the BFP Defense. To the contrary, 
both the black letter law found in the Restatement and this Court's articulation of the rule 
in Kemp v. Zions First Nat 7 Bank, 470 P .2d 390 (Utah 1970) hold it is subject to the 
operation of the recording act and the BFP Defense. 
The district court correctly analyzed the recording act and BFP Defense in 
determining that Farias qualified as a bona fide purchaser for value. As stated above, 
when Farias purchased the Property for value, it is undisputed that he had no actual 
knowledge of the Phalen Trust Deed or Insight Assets' claim that it continued to 
encumber the Property. Because he had no actual knowledge of the Phalen Trust Deed 
and Insight Assets' claim, it is axiomatic he could not be put on "inquiry notice" of the 
same. The only issue remaining for consideration, therefore, is whether he had 
constructive "record notice" of Insight Assets' claim. Under Utah law, the order of 
recording governs priority under the recording statute. The only argument Insight Assets 
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made in the district court to support the argument that the recording order should not 
control is that Farias is somehow charged with the knowledge of a title company that may 
have seen the trust deed (even though Insight Assets produced no evidence that Farias 
had obtained title insurance, what search the title insurer performed, or what the results of 
the search showed). Even assuming Farias obtained title insurance, this argument is 
without any legal support, and thus the district court correctly determined that Farias 
qualified as a bona fide purchaser. 
Argument II: While the district court did not need to address the issue because it 
ruled on the basis of the recording act and the BFP Defense, Insight Assets' claim would 
fail in any event because the Purchase Money Rule would not apply to the transaction in 
which the FFFC Trust Deed and the Phalen Trust Deed arose. The Purchase Money Rule 
does not apply to the detriment of a third-party purchase money lender like FFFC where 
it does not have knowledge of the vendor's purchase money mortgage. In this case, 
Insight Assets was unable to produce any evidence that FFFC knew about the Phalen 
Trust Deed. Instead, it argued that because the Phalens and FFFC shared a common 
escrow agent at the closing of the transaction, somehow the escrow agent's knowledge of 
the Phalen Trust Deed was imputed to FFFC. Again, this argument is contrary to law, 
which holds an escrow agent is a limited agent, and its knowledge is not imputed to a 
principal. The Purchase Money Rule would therefore not apply to the Phalen Trust Deed 
and FFFC Trust Deed conveyances. 
Argument III: Again, because the district court ruled in Farias' favor under the 
BFP Defense, it did not reach his argument that Insight Assets' claim is barred under the 
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doctrine of laches. Insight Assets brings the present claim several years after the 
foreclosure of the FFFC Trust Deed, and numerous parties have bought and sold the 
Property on the basis that the FFFC Trust Deed extinguished the Phalen Trust Deed. 
Insight Assets' (and the Phalens') delay in bringing the present claim has prejudiced 
Farias' ability to defend the claim. Specifically, with the lapse of time, Farias has been 
unable to locate the Boecks to obtain information about their transaction with the 
Phalens. More problematic, due to the intervening crash in the lending and real estate 
markets, many lenders, including FFFC, have gone out of business. Farias therefore is 
incapable of locating and obtaining critical evidence from FFFC to support his defense. 
It is precisely this type of situation to which the doctrine of laches applies. Accordingly, 
the Court could affirm the district court's decision on this basis as well. 
Argument IV: The district court denied Farias' request for an award of attorney 
fees under Utah's reciprocal fee statute (§ 78B-5-826) on the basis that he was not a party 
to the Phalen Trust Deed or the Trust Deed Note (which contain attorney fee provisions 
in favor of the beneficiary/holder). In doing so, the district incorrectly interpreted and 
applied Utah law that holds only one party to the litigation need be a party to the writing 
that confers the right to an award of attorney fees. Farias prevailed in the litigation, and 
as the purported assignee of the Phalen Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note, at least one 
party - Insight Assets - had the right to an award of attorney fees had it prevailed. Farias 
is therefore entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
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ARGUMENT 
L FARIAS TAKES THE PROPERTY FREE OF ANY INTEREST ARISING 
UNDER THE PHALEN TRUST DEED AS A BONA FIDE PURCHASER 
FOR VALUE. 
While Insight Assets makes several errors of law, one of the most critical errors it 
makes, which underlies its entire position in this matter, is its argument and belief that a 
vendor purchase money mortgage always has priority over any other interest in real 
property, regardless of its order of recording or any other factor. Appellant's Brief, p. 9. 
Insight Assets further asserts that "a vendor trust deed recorded simultaneously with a 
third party trust deed in the same transaction is on its face in a first lien position, without 
further inquiry into the recorded documents," and that a vendor trust deed therefore 
operates to the detriment of subsequent purchasers for value by providing "clear notice to 
anyone looking at the title that the vendor trust deed is superior, regardless of recording 
order." Id. at p. 17. Simply put, Insight Assets overstates the scope and application of 
the rule, and relies on case law that does not even address the situation presented in this 
case involving a subsequent purchaser acquiring real property years later without any 
knowledge that the seller trust deed at issue was not extinguished through foreclosure of 
an earlier-recorded trust deed. To understand the error in Insight Assets' argument, it is 
useful to discuss the role of Utah's recording act, the defense it embodies for bona fide 
purchasers for value, as well as the scope and proper application of the Purchase Money 
Rule (including its interaction with recording statutes). 
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A. Utah's Recording Act and the Bona Fide Purchaser for Value Defense. 
1. Utah is a "Race-Notice" Jurisdiction. 
Recording statutes in this country have long operated to determine the priority of 
various interests and property rights on the basis of notice, recording, or some 
combination of the two. See ALH Holding Co. v. The Bank ofTelluride, 18 P.3d 742, 
744 (Colo. 2000). Utah has a recording statute, which provides as follows: 
57-3-103. Effect of failure to record. 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as 
against any subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any 
portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith 
and for a valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-3-103 (2011). This statute is characterized as a "race-notice" 
statute," and thus Utah is a race-notice jurisdiction. See Haik v. Sandy City, 2011 UT 26, 
<[fl3,254P.3dl71. Concerning the priority of competing interests in property, this Court 
has ruled "[u]nder our recording act, priority is given to that document which is recorded 
before another that asserts the same interest. This is the time-honored method of 
determining interests in property. One's priority must necessarily be established by the 
sequence of entry numbers." Anderson v. American Savings & Loan Assn., 668 P.2d 
1253, 1254 (Utah 1983).2 Indeed, Insight Assets acknowledges that priority of interests 
is generally established by recording order. Appellant's Brief, p. 12. Accordingly, 
Utah's recording act and reviewing the order of recording of prior interests in real 
2
 This statement is partially correct, inasmuch as there is a "notice" aspect to priority 
under Utah's recording statute as well. See Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass 'n v. Wasatch 
Bank of Pleasant Grove, 734 P.2d 904, 906 n. 2 (Utah 1986). 
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property provides subsequent purchasers, lenders, and other parties acquiring an interest 
in real property with a reliable method of determining title to, and any encumbrances on, 
real property (assuming they have no actual knowledge that the priority of interests in 
property is other than as reflected in the order of their recording). 
2. The Bona Fide Purchaser for Value Defense. 
Embodied within Utah's recording statue is the BFP Defense. Under the BFP 
Defense, a party who acquires real property for value without actual or constructive 
notice of any interest, claims, or equities against his predecessor's title, does so free of 
said interests, claims or equities as a "bona fide purchaser for value." See 11 AM. JUR. 2d 
Vendor and Purchaser § 368 (2010); Haik, 2011 UT 26 at f 13 ("a subsequent purchaser 
for value prevails over a previous purchaser if the subsequent purchaser (1) takes title in 
good faith and (2) records before the previous purchaser."). Utah has long recognized the 
BFP Defense against off-record claims and unrecorded interests in property. See e.g., 
Bennion Ins. Co. v. 1st OK Corp., 571 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1977); Pender v. Dowse, 265 P.2d 
644 (Utah 1954); and Lawley v. Hickenlooper, 212 P. 526 (Utah 1922). In commenting 
on the strong public policy favoring bona fide purchasers for value, one court recently 
noted that "one who buys bona fide and for value occupies one of the most highly 
favored positions in the law," and that the defense brings a much desired stability and 
certainty in real property law. Scotch Bonnett Realty Corp. v. Matthews, 11 A.3d 801, 
810-11 (Md.Ct.App. 2011). 
To establish the BFP Defense in Utah, one must (1) acquire an interest in real 
property for value, (2) in good faith, and (3) record one's interest first. See Haik, 2011 
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UT 26 at Tj 13 {citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-3-103). "To be in good faith, a subsequent 
purchaser must take [title to] the property without notice of a prior, unrecorded interest in 
the property." Id. at % 14 (quoting Salt Lake City v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 
23, [^ 13, 89 P.3d 155). Utah recognizes two types of notice: (1) actual notice, and (2) 
constructive notice. See id. "Actual notice arises from actual knowledge 'of an 
unrecorded interest or infirmity in the grantor's title."5 Id. Regarding constructive 
notice, this Court held: 
Constructive notice can be either inquiry or record notice. To be on 
inquiry notice, a person must have "[actual] knowledge of certain 
facts and circumstances that are sufficient to give rise to a duty to 
inquire further." But inquiry notice "does not arise from a record." 
Record notice "results from a record or . . . is imputed by the 
recording statutes." Thus, purchasers of real property are charged 
with having record notice of the contents of recorded documents. 
Id. (quoting First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 838 (Utah 1998)). 
3. The District Court did not Err in Holding Utah's Recording Statute 
Creates a Bona Fide Purchaser Defense. 
Insight Assets argues the district court erred in holding the recording act creates a 
bona fide purchaser defense. Appellant's Brief, p. 24. It asserts that the BFP Defense is 
only a "creature of common law as defined by this Court" in Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 
1188, 1197-98 (Utah 1993), and not a product of the recording statute. Id. Insight Assets 
then goes on to cite the alleged common law articulation of the rule: "one who pays 
valuable consideration for a conveyance, acts in good faith, and takes without notice of 
an adverse claim or others' outstanding rights to the seller's estate." Id. (citing Baldwin, 
850 P.2d at 1197-98). This argument is without merit. 
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Farias does not dispute that the BFP Defense has its origins in common law, and 
has been recognized for years by courts. A comparison of Section 57-3-103 with the 
common law articulation of the rule set out in Baldwin, however, shows that the two are 
substantively identical. Insight Assets makes the mistake of assuming that the two are 
mutually exclusive. Utah's recording statute is the codification of the defense as a means 
for establishing priority of interests in real property. No error occurred by the district 
court in applying the defense under the recording statute, particularly where the result 
would be the same under the common law rule as well. 
B, The Purchase Money Mortgage Rule. 
A "purchase money mortgage" is a mortgage given to a vendor of the real estate or 
to a third party lender to the extent that the proceeds are used to acquire title to the real 
estate. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROPERTY, MORTGAGES, § 7.2 (1996). A "vendor 
purchase money mortgage" arises where the vendor receives part of the purchase price 
for property in cash, and takes back a mortgage on the real estate to secure a promissory 
note for the balance of the purchase price. See id. at cmt. a. Similarly, when a third 
party lender takes the purchaser's promissory note secured by a mortgage on the 
purchaser's newly acquired real estate, the mortgage is characterized as a "third party 
purchase money mortgage." See id. 
1. The Priority Afforded Purchase Money Mortgages. 
Under the common law, a purchase money mortgage is conferred priority over any 
mortgage, lien, or other claim that attaches to the real estate but is created by or arises 
against the purchaser-mortgagor's acquisition of title to the real estate. See e.g., 
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RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROPERTY, MORTGAGES, § 7.2; Nelson v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390, 
394 (Utah 1983) (finding a purchase money mortgage had priority over a pre-existing 
judgment lien against the purchaser's real property). The rationale for the preference 
given to purchase money mortgages in this situation is as follows: 
The vendor-mortgagee should prevail because the lien creditor has 
not extended credit or perfected the lien in reliance on the right to be 
repaid out of any specific property, much less out of real estate 
previously owned by the vendor. This is obvious, since the 
judgment was obtained before the debtor acquired the real estate to 
which the judgment lien attached. . . But for the willingness of the 
vendor to part with the real estate, it would have been completely 
unavailable to those persons for the satisfaction of their claims. To 
give such claimants priority over the vendor would confer on them a 
pure windfall. 
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROPERTY, MORTGAGES, § 7.2 at cmt. b; see also Nelson, 
669 P.2d at 394. 
A different issue is presented where there are competing purchase money 
mortgages given in the same transaction, such as a vendor purchase money mortgage and 
a third-party purchase mortgage. The priority given to either mortgage depends on the 
operation of the recording act. 
2. The Interplay of the Recording Statute, the BFP Defense and the 
Purchase Money Rule. 
The underlying theme of Insight Assets' argument is that a vendor purchase 
money mortgage enjoys priority over every other mortgage, claim or interest in real 
property, regardless of the order of recording and/or what the documents of record 
reflect. Appellant's Brief, p. 9 ("Yet under Utah law, vendor mortgages have first 
priority regardless of recording order..."); 12 ("Yet Utah law recognizes that vendor 
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purchase money mortgages supersede Utah's race-notice statute.'5). This claim is 
incorrect and is contrary to both Utah case law addressing the priority of purchase money 
mortgages, as well as the common law. Not a single articulation of the Purchase Money 
Rule holds that the rule supersedes recording acts, that order of recording is forever 
irrelevant as to all future bona fide purchasers, or that purchase money mortgages are 
exempt from the protection afforded bona fide purchasers for value. To the contrary, 
every articulation of the rule holds that this priority rule is subject first and foremost to 
the operation of applicable recording acts. 
Oddly, Insight Assets relies on Kemp v. Zions First Nat 7 Bank, 470 P.2d 390 
(Utah 1970) to support its argument that the Purchase Money Rule is immutable, 
absolute, and supersedes recording acts and the BFP Defense. Appellant's Brief, p. 12. 
In fact, this Court stated the exact opposite in its decision in Kemp, by noting that 
whether the preference given to purchase money mortgages applies "depends upon the 
circumstances of the given case, the equities, and the effect of the recording act" Kemp, 
470 P.2d at 393 (emphasis added). Courts of other jurisdictions have held similarly. For 
example, the Colorado Supreme Court in ALH Holding Co. started its analysis with the 
recording act. Indeed, it noted that "Bray [a prior Colorado decision] recognized, 
however, that purchase money mortgages were instruments to which the recording 
statute applied" ALH Holding Co, 18 P.3d at 745 (emphasis added). The court 
established that the Purchase Money Rule only applies "when the priority of rights in real 
property is not dictated by the operation of the recording statute. . . ." Id. at 746. The 
court only applied the common law priority rule after it determined that Colorado's race-
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notice statute did not apply, because both the seller and the third-party lender had actual 
knowledge that each other was taking an interest in the property and had not agreed on 
the priority of their interests. Id. at 745-46. 
The Restatement also makes clear that the Purchase Money Rule is expressly 
subject to the operation of recording acts. In articulating the rule providing a preference 
to vendors vis-a-vis third party purchase mortgagees, it states: 
A purchase money mortgage given to a vendor of real estate, in the 
absence of a contrary intent of the parties to it and subject to the 
operation of the recording acts, has priority over a purchase money 
mortgage on that real estate given to a person who is not its vendor. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROPERTY, MORTGAGES, § 7.2 (emphasis added). The comments 
to the section further clarify the interplay between recording acts and the Purchase 
Money Rule. For example, if both the vendor and the third-party lender have notice of 
the other's mortgage, the vendor's mortgage will be superior to its third party 
counterpart, in the absence of any intent or agreement between the two as to the priority 
of their respective interests. See id. at cmt. d. In such a case, "the recording acts do not 
vary this result, since the great majority of states [including Utah] they award priority 
only to a subsequent purchaser without notice, and here each mortgagee has notice of the 
other.5' Id. By extension, the BFP defense would not apply to a third party lender in such 
a situation because he has actual notice of the seller's mortgage. 
Likewise, the vendor will also prevail where both he and the third-party lender 
lack notice of the other's mortgage. The rationale for this result is that the recording acts 
will not vary this result "since they operate to award priority only to a subsequent 
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purchaser without notice, and here neither mortgagee can meaningfully be said to be 
subsequent to the other, since both mortgages arise from the same transaction." Id. 
Finally, the Restatement holds that "where only one of the parties has notice of the 
other, the recording acts, rather than [the Purchase Money Rule], should govern and 
award priority to the party lacking notice. . . ." Id. This is exactly the result this Court 
reached in Kemp. See Kemp, 470 P.2d at 393 (holding that the Purchase Money Rule did 
not apply to Zions Bank, a third-party mortgagee, where it had no actual or constructive 
notice of the vendor's trust deed). 
In short, the Purchase Money Rule only applies to give preference to a vendor 
purchase money mortgagee over a third-party purchase money mortgagee where (i) the 
third-party lender and vendor know of each other's mortgage and do not have an intent or 
agreement regarding the priority of their respective interests, (ii) the vendor purchase 
money mortgagee is unaware of the third-party lender's mortgage, and the third-party 
mortgagee knows of the vendor's purchase money mortgage, or (iii) where neither of the 
lender's know of each other's mortgage. The rationale for favoring the vendor in these 
instances has been stated as follows: 
Nevertheless, the equities favor the vendor. Not only does the 
vendor part with specific real estate rather than money, but the 
vendor would never relinquish it at all except on the understanding 
that the vendor will be able to use it to satisfy the obligation to pay 
the price. This is the case even though the vendor may know that the 
mortgagor is going to finance the transaction in part by borrowing 
from a third party and giving a mortgage to secure that obligation. 
In the final analysis, the law is more sympathetic to the vendor's 
hazard of losing real estate previously owned than to the third party 
lender's risk of being unable to collect from an interest in the real 
estate that never previously belonged to it. 
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RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROPERTY, MORTGAGES, § 7.2, cmt. 6. 
For these reasons, Insight Assets is wrong in arguing that the Purchase Money 
Rule operates to the exclusion of the recording acts and the BFP Defense, and to the 
detriment of subsequent parties relying on the order in which documents are recorded. 
C. The District Court Correctly Determined that Farias Took the 
Property Free of any Claim by Insight Assets Under the Phalen Trust 
Deed* 
This case originates from a transaction occurring in 2004. At that time, the 
Boecks and the Phalens entered into an agreement whereby the Boecks agreed to 
purchase the Property from the Phalens [R. 374-84.] The Boecks' purchase of the 
Property was financed through third-party financing from FFFC, and seller financing 
provided by the Phalens [R. 374.] Both financings were secured by trust deeds - the 
Phalen Trust Deed and the FFFC Trust Deed. The FFFC Trust Deed was recorded prior 
to the Phalen Trust Deed [R. 386-402; 345-48.] The Boecks subsequently defaulted on 
their loan with FFFC, and a foreclosure occurred under the FFFC Trust Deed. [R. 326-
27.] Since that time, the Property has been conveyed to four different parties — Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A., TTR Holdings, LLC, Alan H. Reisert, and finally to Farias. [R. 327.] 
Under Utah law, at the time of the foreclosure under the FFFC Trust Deed and the 
execution by the trustee of the Trustee's Deed conveying the property to Wells Fargo, all 
junior encumbrances and were extinguished. Specifically, Utah Code Annotated Section 
57-1-27 provides in part: 
(3) The trustee's deed shall operate to convey to the purchaser, 
without right of redemption, the trustee's title and all right, title, 
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interest, and claim of the trustor and the trustor's successors in 
interest and of all persons claiming by, through, or under them, in 
and to the property sold, including all right, title, interest, and claim 
in and to the property acquired by the trustor or the trustor's 
successors in interest subsequent to the execution of the trust deed, 
which trustee's deed shall be considered effective and relate back to 
the time of the sale. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-27 (2011). This is consistent with the common law, which 
holds that a foreclosure by a senior trust deed or lien will foreclose and extinguish the 
liens arising from any junior and subordinate instruments. See gen. City Consumer 
Services, Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234 (Utah 1991); Randall v. Valley Title, 681 P.2d 219 
(Utah 1984). Consequently, when Farias acquired the Property, the recorded documents 
showed a foreclosure under the earlier-recorded FFFC Trust Deed which extinguished the 
Phalen Trust Deed. 
This dispute arose when Insight Assets purportedly obtained an assignment of the 
Phalen Trust Deed, and claimed it was not extinguished by foreclosure of the FFFC Trust 
Deed because it was actually senior in priority to the FFFC Trust Deed by virtue of 
application of the Purchase Money Rule. Farias, however, is protected from such off-
record claim as a bona fide purchaser. As stated above, to qualify as a bona fide 
purchaser, Farias must establish (1) he acquired an interest in the Property, (2) in good 
faith, and (3) recorded his interest first. See Haik, 2011 UT 26 at ^ 13 {citing UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 57-3-103). 
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1. Farias Acquired the Property for Value. 
At the time Farias acquired the Property, he did so for value. See Declaration of 
Homero Farias, f^ 2 [R. 450.] Insight Assets does not dispute that Farias acquired the 
Property for value, and thus this element of the BFP Defense is satisfied. 
2. Farias did not have Actual Knowledge of the Phalen Trust Deed and 
any Claim that it Remained an Encumbrance on the Property. 
At the time he acquired the Property, Farias had no knowledge of the existence of 
the Phalen Trust Deed, including any claim that it continued to encumber the Property. 
See Declaration of Homero Farias, ^ 4-6 [R. 450.] Farias therefore had no "actual 
notice" of the Phalen Trust Deed, and Insight Assets' claim that it continued to encumber 
the Property. 
In an attempt to refute this evidence, Insight Assets argues that Equity Title 
Insurance ("Equity"), the purported issuer of Farias' title insurance policy, was allegedly 
an agent of both Farias and First American Title Insurance Company ("FATCO"), that 
Equity conducted a title search, that FATCO knew about the Purchase Money Rule, and 
that this knowledge was somehow imputed through Equity to Farias. Appellant's Brief, 
p. 30. Insight Assets failed to offer any evidence at the district court level, however, that 
Equity was either Farias or FATCO's agent, that Equity conducted a title search, what the 
results of any such search were, or that it issued a title insurance policy to Farias. 
Further, even if Insight Assets had shown that Equity was in fact Farias' title 
insurer and conducted a title search revealing the prior recording of the Phalen Trust 
Deed, it still would not result in Equity's knowledge being imputed to Farias. Any title 
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insurance policy Farias obtained in connection with his acquisition of the Property is 
simply a contract. See e.g., Holmes Development, LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, \ 24, 48 
P.3d 895 ("A title insurance policy, like other insurance policies, serves as a contract 
between the insurer and the insured...."); see also Wallace v. Frontier Bank, N.A., 903 
So. 2d 792, 801 (Ala. 2004) (holding that title insurance company is independent 
contractor and that insured exercises no supervision or control over them); Lewis v. 
Superior Court, 30 Cal.App.4th 1850, 1869 (1994) (holding that title insurance company 
is in business for profit and title insurance policy is the result of an arm's length deal, in 
which there is no room for the operation of fiduciary relationships). 
There is no Utah authority holding that an agency relationship arises between 
parties to a contract, and thus the knowledge of one is imputed to the other. Courts of 
other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue, however, have held that a title insurer's 
knowledge is not imputed to the insured. "It is a 'well-settled rule ... that a title insurance 
company is not the agent of its insured, and the insurer's knowledge is not imputed to its 
insured.'" See Lewis, 30 Cal.App.4th at 1870 (holding as a matter of law that title 
insurer's knowledge is not imputed to insured); see also e.g., In re Marriage ofCloney, 
91 Cal. App.4th 429, 438-39 (2001); Wallace, 903 So. 2d at 801; Huntington v. Mila, Inc., 
75 P.3d 354, 359 (Nev. 2003) (holding that lender was bona fide encumbrancer because 
title insurer's knowledge could not be imputed to insured). As the Lewis court properly 
recognized, imputing the knowledge of a title insurer to its insured: 
would be like imputing a car salesperson's knowledge of defective brakes 
to an unsuspecting buyer, and then using that imputed knowledge to subject 
the buyer to liability for reckless conduct for driving a car with actual 
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knowledge that its brakes didn't work. Such a conclusion would be contrary 
to law, as well as to the most basic notions of fair play. It is no more 
appropriate here. 
Lewis, 30 Cal.App.4th at 1870. 
Because a title insurer is not the agent of its insured, its knowledge cannot be 
imputed to its insured. Thus, whatever knowledge any title insurance company had 
concerning the Purchase Money Rule and the state of the title, cannot be imputed to 
Farias. See In re Marriage ofCloney, 91 Cal.App. 4th 429, 438-39 (Cal.App.Ct. 2001). 
Moreover, even if Equity were Farias' agent (there is also no proof FATCO was 
Farias' agent), the fact that FATCO was generally aware of the Purchase Money Rule 
would not give rise to actual knowledge that the Phalen Trust Deed allegedly remained an 
encumbrance on the Property and was not foreclosed out, simply because it was a 
purchase money mortgage. Insight Assets has failed to produce any evidence to dispute 
Farias' testimony that he had no knowledge of the Phalen Trust Deed and any claim it 
continued to encumber the Property. 
4. Farias had no Constructive Record Notice of the Phalen Trust Deed 
and any Claim that it Remained an Encumbrance on the Property. 
As a preliminary matter, the Phalen Trust Deed should be treated as an 
"unrecorded document" for purposes of Utah's recording statute in light of the 
foreclosure of the earlier-recorded FFFC Trust Deed. This is similar to this Court's 
treatment of a recorded trust deed in Diversified Equities, Inc. v. American Sav. & Loan 
Assn., 739 P.2d 1133 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In Diversified, a lender was a beneficiary of 
a recorded trust deed, and a deed of reconveyance regarding said trust deed was later 
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recorded, which the lender claimed occurred through error or mistake. See id. at 1134-
1135. Prior to the lender's recording an affidavit regarding the alleged error, subsequent 
purchasers acquired the property without knowledge of the lender's claim of an 
improvidently recorded deed of reconveyance, and thus were unaware of the lender's 
claim that the trust deed still encumbered the property. See id. Even though the lender's 
trust deed was recorded, and thus subsequent purchasers had constructive record notice of 
it, this Court treated it as "unrecorded" for purposes of the recording statute, because 
absent the lender's "off-record" claim of mistake or error in recording the deed of 
reconveyance, the deed of reconveyance would have extinguished the trust deed. See id. 
at 1136, fn. 3. Likewise, in this case, but for Insight Assets' claim that the Purchase 
Money Rule applies to the Phalen Trust Deed, the Phalen Trust Deed would have been 
extinguished in the foreclosure of the FFFC Trust Deed, and thus the Phalen Trust Deed 
should be treated as an "unrecorded document" for purposes of Farias' BFP Defense. 
Regarding "notice," Farias had no "actual notice" the Phalen Trust Deed continued 
to encumber the Property. Without such actual notice or knowledge, as a matter of law, 
Farias was not on "inquiry notice" of the trust deed's continued existence as a lien on the 
Property. See Haik, 2011 UT 26 at If 13 (quoting J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d at 838). 
Accordingly, the only issue remaining to determine if Farias is protected by the BFP 
Defense against Insight Assets' claim is whether the Warranty Deed from the Phalens to 
3
 Even if the Court were to narrowly construe the BFP defense under Section 57-3-103 as 
not applying to "off-record" claims regarding recorded documents, such as the claim 
Insight Assets now brings, the common law bona fide purchaser for value defense would 
still protect Farias against "adverse claims" and "other's outstanding rights." See 
Baldwin, 850 P.2d at 1197-98. 
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the Boecks, the FFFC Trust Deed, and/or the Phalen Trust Deed put Farias on 
constructive record notice that the Phalen Trust Deed was not extinguished by foreclosure 
of the FFFC Trust Deed because the Purchase Money Rule elevated it in priority ahead of 
the FFFCT Trust Deed. For this to occur, the recorded documents would have to 
establish all of the following: 
• The Phalen Trust Deed actually secured "purchase money" and therefore 
was a purchase money mortgage. 
• The knowledge of FFFC and the Phalens regarding each other's trust deeds. 
Specifically, for Insight Assets to prevail, the recorded documents must 
show that either FFFC knew of the Phalen Trust Deed or both FFFC and 
the Phalens were unaware of each other's trust deeds. Stated differently, 
the Purchase Money Rule would not apply if FFFC did not know of the 
Phalen Trust Deed, but the Phalens knew of the FFFC Trust Deed; 
• If FFFC and the Phalens did in fact have knowledge of each other's trust 
deeds, the recorded documents must show an absence of an intent or 
agreement by FFFC and the Phalens as to the priority of their respective 
purchase money mortgages; and 
• The circumstances and equities of the transaction warrant a court applying 
the rule. 
See Nelson, 669 P.2d at 394; Kemp, 470 P.2d at 393; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
PROPERTY (MORTGAGES), § 7.2. There simply is nothing contained in the recorded 
documents that provides constructive notice to Farias of all of the foregoing, such that he 
would be on notice that the Phalen Trust Deed remained a lien on the Property, and was 
not extinguished by the foreclosure of the FFFC Trust Deed, because it enjoyed priority 
under the Purchase Money Rule (despite being recorded in a second position). 
31 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a. Purchase Money. 
The Purchase Money Rule applies to purchase money mortgages, which by 
definition are mortgages (or trust deeds) that secure purchase money. Consequently, the 
Warranty Deed and/or Phalen Trust Deed would have to provide constructive notice to 
Farias that the Phalen Trust Deed secured purchase money. There simply is nothing in 
these documents, however, establishing that the Phalen Trust Deed secured purchase 
money. The only possible way Farias could determine if it did secure money would be 
through further inquiry outside the record - something Utah does not require. See Haik, 
2011 UT 26 at 113. 
b. Knowledge of the Phalens and FFFC 
The Purchase Money Rule only applies where the recording statute by its terms 
does not, which requires an inquiry into the knowledge of FFFC and the Phalens. 
Specifically, if the Phalens knew of the FFFC Trust Deed, but FFFC was unaware of the 
Phalen Trust Deed, the recording act would apply to the exclusion of the Purchase Money 
Rule. See Kemp, 470 P.2d at 393. There is nothing in the Warranty Deed, the FFFC 
Trust Deed, or the Phalen Trust Deed that gives any insight as to whether FFFC was 
aware of the Phalen Trust Deed. Insight Assets argues for the first time on appeal, 
however, that FFFC is "deemed" to know of the Phalen Trust Deed because US Title 
acted as trustee under both trust deeds, and its knowledge is imputed to FFFC. 
Appellant's Brief, pgs. 19-20. Because Insight Assets failed to make this argument 
below, it cannot raise it for the first time on appeal. See Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 
1017, 1022 (Utah 1996). At the district court level, Insight Assets argued that FFFC had 
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knowledge of the Phalen Trust Deed because they shared an escrow agent (as opposed to 
a common trustee), US Title, and thus the knowledge of US Title is imputed to FFFC. 
This argument is flat-rejected by Utah law. 
It is well-established that, at most, an escrow agent is a limited or special agent. 
Schoepe v. Zions First Natl Bank, 750 F. Supp. 1084, 1088-89 (D. Utah 1990). The 
Utah Supreme Court has long-embraced the concept of limited agency, see e.g., Naujoks 
v. Suhrmann, 337 P.2d 967, 969 (Utah 1959) ("It is appreciated that the fact that one may 
be an agent for one purpose does not make him an agent for every purpose, but the 
agency is limited to acts within the scope of authorized duties."), including the concept 
that notice to a limited agent is not imputed to its principals. See Ind. Oil & Gas Co. v. 
Shelton, 6 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah 1932) (concluding that although the escrow agent was 
given actual notice of a preexisting, unrecorded mortgage by one of its principals, such 
knowledge was not imputed to the escrow agent's other principal). There simply is 
nothing of record that put Farias on record that FFFC knew of the Phalen Trust Deed. 
Moreover, even if Insight Assets were allowed to argue for the first time that 
FFFC had knowledge of the Phalen Trust Deed because the two shared a common 
trustee, this argument is without any support. The cases relied on by Insight Assets -
Maoris v. Sculpted Software, Inc., Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., and First Nat 7 Bank of 
Nephi v. Foote - are all cases addressing the issue of whether an agent's knowledge is 
imputed to his principal, and have nothing at all to do with trustees and whether a 
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common trustee's knowledge is imputed to each of the beneficiaries. Further, as a 
matter of law, a common trustee's knowledge is not imputed to the beneficiaries of the 
various trust deeds for which the trustee is appointed. A trustee's duties to the parties of 
a trust deed are confined to those duties memorialized in the deed of trust, and set forth in 
the applicable statutes that have "outlined the steps needed to ensure good faith and fair 
dealing." See Five F, L.L.C. v. Heritage Savings Bank, 2003 UT App 373, f 23, 81 P.3d 
105; UTAH CODE ANN. §§57-1-1, et seq. (setting forth duties of trustee, all of which arise 
only in connection with foreclosure proceedings). Because a trustee's scope of their 
duties is limited to foreclosure, any knowledge acquired by a trustee cannot be imputed to 
the trustor or beneficiary. See Maoris v. Sculptured Software, Inc., 2001 Utah 43, ^ f 21, 
24 P.3d 984 (only knowledge of agent within scope of authority can be imputed to a 
principal). 
c. The Existence/Absence of an Intent or Agreement 
Between the Phalens and FFFC Concerning the 
Priority of their Respective Trust Deeds. 
Even if FFFC and the Phalens were aware of each of others' trust deeds, the 
Purchase Money Rule would only apply in the absence of an intent or agreement of the 
parties regarding the priority of the two trust deeds. See Nelson, 669 P.2d at 394. There 
4
 Insight Assets' argument would lead to unbelievable results where some entities act as 
trustee for numerous trust deeds. For example, some entities, like ReconTrust Company, 
N.A., act as trustees for thousands of trust deeds throughout the country. Apparently, 
Insight Assets would argue that each of the beneficiaries under those trust deeds is 
imputed with the knowledge of the contents of every other trust deed for which an entity 
like ReconTrust Company acts as trustee. 
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is nothing in the recorded documents that suggests, one way or another, the existence or 
absence of any such intent or agreement. 
Insight Assets argues that, in the absence of a written and recorded subordination 
agreement, it is legally impossible for any such intent or agreement to have occurred. 
Consequently, because no written subordination agreement was recorded, as a matter of 
law, no such intent or agreement exists in this case. Appellant's Brief, pgs. 14-16. 
Insight Assets only cites Utah's statute of frauds as support for its argument. Id. at 16. 
Utah law is silent, however, on whether the statute of frauds applies to subordination of 
an interest in real property. Other authorities suggest subordination is not necessarily a 
contract, and thus not subject to the statute of frauds. For example, the Restatement 
notes: 
One frequently sees references to "subordination agreements." It is 
true that a subordination can be incorporated in a contract, and that 
one can contract to give a subordination in the future. However, in 
its essence a subordination is not a contract but a declaration by a 
mortgagee that it is relinquishing the priority of mortgage to some 
other interest. . . . 
See e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROPERTY, MORTGAGES, § 7.7, cmt. a. 
Moreover, where the interests are created as part of the same transaction (like the 
present case), subordination need not occur by writing at all; rather, the parties can 
employ the order of recording to establish the priority of their respective interests. See id, 
§ 7.2 cmt d. ("Subordination by the vendor to a third party mortgagee may sometimes be 
found by virtue of the fact that the latter's mortgage was recorded prior to the former's, if 
the evidence indicates that the particular order of recording was consciously used as a 
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means of establishing priority."); § 7.7 ("Alternatively, the parties may purport to 
establish priority between the mortgage and the other interest by the order of recording 
the two documents."); see also ALHHolding Co., 18 P.3d at 747 (noting that 
subordination can be found through implication by the order of recording documents). 
Consequently, Farias would not be on constructive notice of the absence of an intent or 
agreement to subordinate the Phalen Trust Deed to the FFFC Trust Deed simply because 
no "subordination agreement" was recorded - the order of recording indicated the parties' 
intent regarding the priority of their respective interests. The only way Farias could 
determine that the parties intended otherwise would be through further inquiry, and under 
Utah law he is not required to make any such inquiry. See Haik, 2011 UT 26 at f^ 13. 
d. Constructive Notice of the Equities. 
This Court held in Kemp that the application of the Purchase Money Rule 
"depends upon the circumstances of the given case, the equities. . . ." Kemp, 470 P.2d at 
393. Obviously, it is impossible for a subsequent purchaser like Farias to determine 
whether the circumstances and equities of a transaction that occurred several years prior, 
and to which he was not a party, are such that a court of law would find application of the 
Purchase Money Rule is warranted. For this reason, Farias could not have constructive 
record notice that the priority of the Phalen Trust Deed vis-a-vis the earlier recorded 
FFFC Trust Deed was anything other than as reflected by said order of recording. 
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e. The District Court Correctly Determined Farias was Protected 
under the BFP Defense Against any Claim by Insight Assets 
that the Phalen Trust Deed Continued to Encumber the 
Property. 
The district court correctly rejected Insight Assets' argument that the Purchase 
Money Rule is an immutable, absolute rule that applies to the exclusion of recording acts 
and to the detriment of bona fide purchasers for value. Ruling, p. 3 [R. 575]. For reasons 
explained above, the district court likewise correctly determined that there was no 
evidence Farias had actual notice of Insight Assets' claimed interest (and thus no inquiry 
notice either), and that nothing contained in the recorded documents that would put him 
on constructive record notice of the claimed purchase money priority. See id. at pgs. 4-5 
[R. 576-77.] Further, the district court correctly ruled that "parties are entitled to rely on 
the order of recording." Id. at p. 5 [R. 577.] 
Under Utah law, purchasers of property are entitled to rely on the documents of 
record and the legal effect of those documents. For example, in Diversified Equities, Inc. 
v. American Sav. & Loan Assn., 739 P.2d 1133 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), the defendant 
American Savings held a trust deed on property. The property was conveyed several 
times, but remained subject to the trust deed. One of the subsequent purchasers contacted 
American Savings about the status of the trust deed, and American Savings responded 
that the loan had been repaid, and it then recorded a deed of reconveyance. American 
Savings at some point later determined that the loan in fact had not been repaid, and thus 
the recording of the deed of conveyance was in error. Prior to discovering the alleged 
error, however, the property was conveyed two more times before American recorded an 
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affidavit regarding the alleged error, and thus claiming its trust deed remained an 
encumbrance on the property. The court held that the subsequent purchasers were bona 
fide purchasers for value and without notice of American Savings' alleged error in 
recording the deed of reconveyance. The court noted that because the trust deed had been 
reconveyed, there was no constructive or record notice from that instrument. Id. at 1136-
37. To hold otherwise, the court noted, "would defeat the purpose of the recording 
statutes and subvert the sound commercial policy they promote." Id. at 1137. In this 
case, the record reflects termination of the Phalen Trust Deed as a consequence of the 
foreclosure of the earlier-recorded FFFC Trust Deed, upon which subsequent purchasers 
are entitled to rely. 
Courts of other jurisdictions have ruled that bona fide purchasers are entitled to 
rely on the priority of interests as reflected in the record, and take free of claims that the 
priority is other than as reflected in the record. In Credit Based Asset Servicing & 
Securitization, LLC v. Flagstar Bank, 2007 WL 866935 (Mich. Ct. App. March 22, 
2007), two separate mortgages against a property were consecutively recorded. 2007 WL 
866935, at * 1 (Mich. Ct. App. March 22, 2007). A foreclosure of the first recorded trust 
deed occurred and the property was subsequently sold to a purchaser for value who 
obtained loans for the purchase of the property. Id. The holder of the second recorded 
trust deed subsequently assigned its interest to another party who brought an action that 
asserted that the order of recording of the two trust deeds was incorrect. Id. The court 
held that although the second recorded trust deed appeared in the chain of title the 
subsequent purchaser of the property was allowed to rely on the order of recording and 
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the legal effect of a foreclosure, which would extinguish any junior liens. Id. at * 2-
3. The court also noted that if there was a mistake in the order of recording the two 
mortgages, the lender had opportunity to take corrective action but failed to do so, and 
thus the purchaser at the foreclosure sale was entitled to rely on the record as stated. Id. 
at * 4; see also Land Title Ins. Co. v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 207 P.3d 141 (Colo. 2009) 
(holding that subsequent purchaser was entitled to rely on order of recording to conclude 
that junior lien would have been foreclosed out). 
Similarly, in Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. v. Elfelt, the court ruled that a 
subsequent purchaser was able to rely on the order of recording in determining the 
respective priority of those deeds. 756 N.W.2d 501, 506-07 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2008). Even if the deeds had been recorded in the incorrect order, the subsequent 
purchaser took free and clear of any claim that the order of recording was other than as 
reflected. Id. 
In this case, if the Phalens believed their trust deed was to be senior to the FFFC 
Trust Deed, the Phalens could have instituted an action seeking a determination that 
Insight Assets now seeks five years after the fact, and more than four years after 
foreclosure of the FFFC Trust Deed and several conveyances of the Property since that 
time. The Phalens could have asserted this claim and recorded a lis pendens to give 
notice to the public that the priority of the Phalen Trust Deed vis-a-vis the FFFC Trust 
Deed was other than reflected by the Weber County Recorder's records. They failed to 
do so, and they (and Insight Assets as assignee) cannot now be heard to complain against 
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Farias, a bona fide purchaser for value, that the priority was other than reflected at the 
time Farias acquired the Property. 
At the district court level, the only argument Insight Assets made that Farias 
allegedly had constructive notice the Phalen Trust Deed remained an encumbrance on the 
Property was the fact that no deed of reconveyance had been recorded for the Phalen 
Trust Deed. [R. 473.] Insight Assets continues to make this argument on appeal. 
Appellant's Brief, pgs. 27-28. This argument appears to be a result of a failure to 
understand basic principles of real estate law. Section 57-l-33.1(l)(a) (2011), cited by 
Insight Assets, describes the circumstances where a deed of reconveyance is given -
namely, "when an obligation secured by a trust deed has been satisfied.. . ." UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 57-1-33. l(l)(a) (emphasis added). By executing a deed of reconveyance, the 
trust property is reconveyed back to the trustor. In a foreclosure, however, any junior 
encumbrances are extinguished, and thus the junior lienholder would have nothing to 
reconvey. Accordingly, where a foreclosure of the earlier-recorded FFFC Trust Deed 
occurred, the second-in-time recorded Phalen Trust Deed would normally be 
extinguished, and thus one would not expect any deed of reconveyance to be recorded. 
The only way the Phalen Trust Deed would not be extinguished is if the order of 
recording did not reflect the priority of these trust deeds - i.e., an "off-record55 claim by 
the Phalens or Insight Assets. The absence of a deed of reconveyance did not put Farias 
on notice that the Phalen Trust Deed continued to encumber the Property, and it certainly 
could not trigger a duty on Farias to inquire further outside the record as Insight Assets 
now argues. See Haik, 2011 UT 26 at If 13. 
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In short, nothing contained in the Warranty Deed, the Phalen Trust Deed, and/or 
the FFFC Trust Deed put Farias on constructive record notice that the Phalen Trust Deed 
was not extinguished in the foreclosure of the earlier-recorded FFFC Trust Deed, and 
thus remained an encumbrance on the Property. The district court did not err on this 
point, and its decision should be affirmed. 
II. THE FFFC TRUST DEED IS SUPERIOR TO THE PHALEN TRUST DEED 
BECAUSE THE VENDOR PURCHASE MONEY RULE IS 
INAPPLICABLE. 
This case can be analyzed and decided on several levels. The district court 
analyzed and decided the case based on the effect of the recording act and the BFP 
Defense for the transaction whereby Farias acquired the Property. As explained above, 
the recording act and the BFP Defense, however, could be applied to the transaction 
whereby the Boecks acquired the Property and FFFC took an interest in the Property 
under the FFFC Trust Deed. Likewise, the recording act and the BFP Defense could 
potentially apply to any of Farias5 predecessors in title who took title to the Property after 
foreclosure of the FFFC Trust Deed - Wells Fargo, TTR Holdings, LLC, and Alan 
Reisert. If any of these predecessors in title were protected under the recording statute 
and BFP Defense, Farias would likewise be protected and take title free of Insight Assets' 
claim under the so-called "shelter-rule." See Strekal v. Espe, 114 P.3d 67, 74 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 2004); 77 Am. Jur. 2d Vendor and Purchaser § 419. 
Insight Assets brought this action seeking a declaration that the Phalen Trust Deed 
was senior in priority to the FFFC Trust Deed by invoking the Purchase Money Rule. [R. 
5-6.] As such, Insight Assets bears the burden of establishing all conditions necessary for 
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the application of the rule. The district court did not address whether the rule would have 
applied to the transaction among FFFC, the Phalens, and the Boecks, because it decided 
the case on the basis that Farias was a bona fide purchaser. Even if the district would 
have addressed the issue, however, Insight Assets' claim would fail as a matter of law. 
First, as set forth above, the Purchase Money Rule would not apply if FFFC was 
unaware of the Phalen Trust Deed. The only evidence offered by Insight Assets on this 
point is that FFFC shared a common trustee with the Phalens in US Title, and as 
explained above, this claim fails as a matter of law. Moreover, there is a presumption 
under Utah law that FFFC did not know of the Phalen Trust Deed. Specifically, Utah 
Code Section 57-4a-4 states that a recorded document creates a presumption regarding 
title to the real property affected that "the grantee, transferee, or beneficiary of an interest 
created or described by the document acted in good faith at all relevant times." UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 57-4a-4(l)(f) (2011). "Good faith" for purposes of Utah real estate law 
means lacking actual or constructive notice of an adverse or competing claim or interest 
in property. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, a presumption therefore 
exists that FFFC did not know of the Phalen Trust Deed, in which case the recording act 
would apply and the FFFC Trust Deed would enjoy priority over the Phalen Trust Deed 
as the earlier recorded instrument. See Kemp, 470 P.2d at 393; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES), § 7.2 (c), cmt. d.5 The rule would therefore not apply. 
5This is particularly so where, like the vendor in Kemp, the Phalens accepted the proceeds 
from the FFFC Loan. 
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III. INSIGHT ASSETS9 CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF 
LACHES WHERE IT, AND ITS PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST, 
BROUGHT THE CLAIMS OVER FOUR YEARS AFTER THE FACT AND 
NUMEROUS PARTIES HAVE RELIED ON THEIR INACTION. 
Although the district court decided the case based on Farias' status as a bona fide 
purchaser for value, the district court's decision can also be affirmed because Insight 
Assets' claims are barred by the doctrine of laches. See Bailey, 2002 UT 58, ]f 10 (stating 
an appellate court can affirm on "any legal ground or theory apparent on the record"). 
Utah law recognizes the doctrine of laches, which is "based upon [the] maxim that 
equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights." CIG Exploration, Inc. 
v. State, 2001 UT 37 f^ 15, 24 P.3d 966. "Laches bars a recovery when there has been a 
delay by one party causing a disadvantage to the other party." Collard v. Nagle 
Construction, Inc., 2002 UT App. 306, <[} 28, 57 P.3d 603 {citingPapanikolas Bros. 
Enters, v. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975). As such, 
two elements must be met for laches to bar an action: "(1) a party's lack of diligence and 
(2) an injury resulting from that lack of diligence." See Fundamentalist Church of Jesus 
Christ ofLatter-Day Saints v. Hon. Denise P. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, \ 27, 238 P.3d 1054 
(holding that doctrine of laches barred the petitioners from asserting their claims where 
they had waited over three years to bring their claims challenging the modification of the 
trust and numerous parties had relied on the unchallenged trust modifications in 
conducting transactions). Laches is also applicable where a party is disadvantaged 
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because parties have died, memories have faded, and documents are not obtainable. See 
Nilson-Newey & Co. v. Utah Resources Intern., 905 P.2d 312, 316 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
In this case, both of the elements of laches are present. Insight Assets and its 
predecessor in interest, the Phalens, lacked diligence in bringing their claim that the 
priority of the Phalen Trust Deed vis-a-vis the FFFC Trust Deed was other than as 
reflected in the order of recording in the Weber County Recorder's Office. In April 
2004, the FFFC Trust Deed was recorded prior to the Phalen Trust Deed. On June 7, 
2005, the FFFC Trust Deed was foreclosed and the Property was conveyed to Wells 
Fargo. The Phalens never brought an action to determine the priority of the Phalen Trust 
Deed vis-a-vis the earlier recorded FFFC Trust Deed. Nor did the Phalens attempt to 
foreclose on the Phalen Trust Deed. It was not until August 31, 2009, over five years 
after the Phalen Trust Deed was recorded behind the FFFC Trust Deed and over four 
years after the FFFC Trust Deed was foreclosed, that Insight Assets recorded a notice of 
default, alleging that the Phalen Trust Deed still encumbered the Property. 
During this interim period, numerous parties relied on the priority of the trust 
deeds as established by the order of recording in buying, selling, encumbering, and 
making warranties regarding the Property. Indeed, the Property has been conveyed four 
times since the Boecks purchased the Property. At the time Farias obtained the Property 
in August 2007, he had no knowledge that any party claimed an interest in the Property 
under the Phalen Trust Deed or otherwise. [R. 450.] 
In addition, Insight Assets' and its predecessor in interest's lack of diligence in 
pursuing their claims has placed Farias at a distinct disadvantage in defending his interest 
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in the Property because of the passage of time. The Boecks had moved and could not be 
located, and the lender, FFFC, a primary witness of critical importance in this case, had 
gone out of business and Farias was unable to obtain their records or locate individuals 
who have knowledge of the sale of the Property and the loan made by FFFC.6 [R. 329.] 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT FARIAS WAS NOT 
ENTITLED TO HIS REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826. 
A. The Conditions for Attorney Fees Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826 
are met in this Case. 
"Generally, attorney fees are awarded only when authorized by contract or by 
statute." Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, | 1 1 , 160 P.3d 1041. In this case, both the 
Phalen Trust Deed and the Trust Deed Note allow for attorney fees in favor of the 
beneficiary/holder thereof. While the attorney fees provision in the Phalen Trust Deed 
and the Trust Deed Note are one-sided, in that they only provide a right to attorney fees 
to the beneficiary/holder of the trust deed/note, Utah law rectifies this inequitable 
situation through UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826. This statute provides that: 
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a 
civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other 
writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party 
to recover attorney fees. 
6
 Insight Assets claims are barred by the doctrine of laches even though the statute of 
limitations on the Trust Deed Note had not entirely lapsed when Insight Assets brought 
its judicial foreclosure action. Utah courts have consistently recognized that laches "may 
apply in equity . . . whether or not an applicable statute of limitations has been satisfied." 
See American Tierra Corp. v. West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 763 (Utah 1992); Nilson-
Newey & Co. v. Utah Resources Intern., 905 P.2d 312, 314 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826. To be entitled to attorney fees under this statute, two 
conditions must be met: "first, the underlying litigation must be based upon a contract; 
and second, the contract must allow at least one party to recover attorney fees." See 
Hooban v. Unicity Int'l, Inc., 2009 UT App 287, \ 9, 220 P.3d 485; Bilanzich, 2007 UT 
26,1j 14. 
In this case, both of these elements are met. First, the litigation is based upon a 
contract. Insight Assets sought to foreclose against Farias' property pursuant to the 
Phalen Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note. Second, both the Phalen I rust Deed and the 
Trust Deed Note allow the holder of the Phalen Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note to 
recover attorney fees in enforcing the respective contracts. The relevant portion of the 
Phalen Trust Deed provides that 
[u]pon the occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary shall have the 
option to declare all sums secured hereby immediately due and payable and 
foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure 
of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in 
such proceeding all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be fixed by the court. 
[R. 347.] Similarly, the Trust Deed Note further provides that "if this note is collected by 
an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with or without 
suit, the undersigned, trustors jointly and severally agree to pay all costs and expenses of 
collection including a reasonable attorneys' fee." [R. 404.] Presumably relying on these 
contracts, Insight Assets, in its Complaint claimed that it was entitled to recover its 
attorney fees incurred in bringing the lawsuit. See Complaint, \\ 38-39 [R. 7.] 
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Although the district court purported to exercise its discretion in denying Farias' 
request for attorney fees, it refused to allow attorney fees because "[Farias] is not an 
original party to the Phalen trust deed or the corresponding trust deed note." [R. 578.] In 
doing so, the district court misread and misapplied the decisions in both Bilanzich and 
Hooban. In Bilanzich, this Court repeatedly emphasized that the statute "requires only 
that a party to the litigation assert the writing's enforceability as basis for recovery." 
Bilanzich, 2007 UT 26, ^ 15 (emphasis added). This Court also held that a court may 
award attorney fees to the prevailing party where "the litigation was based on a writing 
that granted attorney fees to at least one of the parties in the litigation." Id. at f^ 16 
(emphasis added). Contrary to the holding of the district court, there is no requirement 
that both parties to the lawsuit be original parties to the contract. In Hooban, the Utah 
Court of Appeals explicitly held that even though Hooban was not a party to the original 
contract, it could still recover attorney fees pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826 
because "the statute 'requires only a party to the litigation assert the [contract's] 
enforceability as a basis for recovery." 2009 UT App 287, Tf 9 (alteration in original). 
The district court's ruling interpreted this Court's ruling in Bilanzich that the 
statute "was designed to 'create a level playing field' for parties to a contractual dispute," 
Bilanzich, 2007 UT 26, \ 18, to require that both litigants be parties to the contract. As 
Bilanzich makes clear, for Section 78B-5-826 to be applicable, the parties must merely be 
parties to the contractual dispute. Because Farias and Insight Assets are both parties to 
the contractual dispute, Section 78B-5-826 is applicable and the district court should have 
awarded attorney fees to Farias. 
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B. The Underlying Policies of the Statute Support an Award of Attorney Fees 
in this Case. 
Although UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826 leaves it to the discretion of the district 
court to determine whether to award attorney fees, this Court has noted that "district 
courts should award fees liberally under Utah Code section [78B-5-826] where pursuing 
or defending an action results in an unequal exposure to the risk of contractual liability 
for attorney fees." Bilanzich, 2007 UT 26, f 19. This Court identified two underlying 
policies behind the statute. First, the statute was designed to remedy "the unequal 
allocation of litigation risks." Id, at j^ 18 (emphasis added). "[E]xposure to the risk of a 
contractual obligation to pay attorney fees must give rise to a corresponding risk of a 
statutory obligation to pay fees." Id. at j[ 19. Second, this Court stated that the statute 
"rectifies the inequitable common law result where a party that seeks to enforce a 
contract containing an attorney fees clause has a significant bargaining advantage over a 
party that seeks to invalidate the contract." Id. at 118. 
The district court, however, misstated the underlying policies and applied an 
incorrect standard in weighing the attorney fees issues. Although Bilanzich holds that the 
purpose behind the reciprocal fees statute is "to 'creat[e] a level playing field' for parties 
to a contractual dispute," 2007 UT 26, ]f 18, the district court refused to grant attorney 
fees because it stated an award of attorney fees would not help in '"creating a level 
playing field' between contractual parties." See Ruling [R. 578,] The district court's 
ruling required that the litigants not only be parties to a contractual dispute, but that they 
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be actual parties to the contract. This additional requirement is not supported by Utah 
law. 
Here, each of the underlying policies of the statute supports an award of attorney 
fees. There is unequal litigation risk to pay attorney fees between Insight Assets and 
Farias that is created by the Phalen Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note. In taking the 
assignment of the Phalen Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note and seeking to enforce it 
against Farias and the Property, Insight Assets would have been entitled to its attorney 
fees under the contract had it prevailed. Farias would have been forced to pay off the 
amount owed under the Phalen Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note, including the attorney 
fees incurred by Insight Assets, to prevent foreclosure of his Property. Under the Phalen 
Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note, Farias is not similarly entitled to his attorney fees. As 
such, Insight Assets held a distinct bargaining advantage over Farias. This inequitable 
position created by the Phalen Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note is exactly what UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826 was designed to prevent. The reciprocal attorney fees statute 
subjects Insight Assets to a statutory claim for attorney fees to balance out the litigation 
risks of the parties. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Farias respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
the District Court's grant of summary judgment in its favor and denial of Insight Assets' 
motion for summary judgment relating to Farias' status as a bona fide purchaser for 
value. Farias further requests the Court to overturn the District Court's denial of Farias' 
request for attorney fees pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826, and remand this 
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case to the District Court with instructions to determine and award the reasonable amount 
of attorney fees incurred by Farias. 
DATED this 12th day of October, 2011. 
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS, P.C. 
By: 
Ronalu GvRussell 
Rodger M. Burge 
Jeffery A. Balls 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 




HOMERO FARIAS, an individual, 
Defendant. 
HOMERO FARIAS, ' 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. . .- .•;.'...• • • ••.
 t .; • 
INSIGHT ASSETS, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, and W, ANDREW 
McCULLOUGH, in his capacity as Trustee, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
RULING 
Case No. 090908263 
Judge W. Brent West 
This matter is before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment. Summary 
judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Here, because the 
undisputed facts establish that Defendant had no actual or constructive knowledge of Plaintiff s 
claim to the property in controversy, Defendant is entitled to the protection of Utah's recording 
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act and takes the property free of all other interests as a bona fide purchaser for value. For this 
reason, the Court grants Defendant's motion for summary judgment 
I. Undisputed Factual Background 
Defendant owns the real property that is the subject of this dispute (hereinafter "the 
property"). After Defendant purchased the property in 2007, Plaintiff claimed a lien on the 
property by way of a trust deed that had been assigned to it by Joseph and Denise Phalen, The 
Phalens, who were prior owners of the property, took this trust deed as security for their 
financing a portion of the purchase price of the property when they sold it to William and 
Roberta Boeck via wauanty deed in 2004. This trust deed, however, was recorded in a second 
position behind a trust deed given to a third-party lender, First Franklin Financial Corporation 
("FFFC"). The Boecks subsequently defaulted and the prior-recorded FFFC trust deed was 
foreclosed. Three years after the foreclosure, Defendant purchased the property. 
II, Analysis 
Plaintiff argues that its trust deed was not extinguished by the foreclosure of the prior-
recorded FFFC trust deed because the common law confers priority on a vendors purchase 
money mortgage over a third-party lender's purchase money mortgage. Plaintiffs argument 
fails, however, because this common law rule is not absolute. On the contrary, a review of the 
case law clearly demonstrates that the vendor purchase money priority rule is subject to the 
recording act. Consequently, since the facts establish that Defendant is a bona fide purchaser for 
value under Utah's recording act, Defendant takes free of Plaintiff s claim that its vendor 
purchase money mortgage remains an encumbrance on the property. 
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A. The Vendor Purchase Money Priority Rule is Subject to the Recording Act 
The Court is unaware of any case granting absolute priority to vendor purchase money 
mortgages, In fact, Utah case law is quite clear that there are exceptions to the rule. In Kemp v. 
Zions First National Bank 470 P.2d 390 (Utah 1970), the Utah Supreme Court recognized the 
general rule that "[w]here the contest is between a purchase money mortgage to a third person 
who advances part of the purchase price and a purchase money mortgage to the vendor for the 
balance, the latter is given preference even if he had notice of the former/* Id. at 393. However, 
the Court also recognized that "in spite of the foregoing generalities,... an examination of the 
authorities and the principles involved will show that the result actually depends upon the 
circumstances of the given case, the equities, and the effect of the recording act " Id (emphasis 
added). This view is in line with the Restatement. "A purchase money mortgage given to a 
vendor of real estate, in the absence of a contrary intent of the parties to it and subject to the 
operation of the recording acts, has priority over a purchase money mortgage on that real estate 
given to a person who is not its vendor." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES), 
§ 7.2(c) (emphasis added). In light of these authorities, the Court believes Plaintiffs position 
overstates the scope of the vendor purchase money priority rule. The rule does not apply in every 
situation, but is rather subject to the operation of the recording act. 
B. Defendant Takes Free of Plaintiffs Claim to the Property Because he is a Bona Fide 
Purchaser for Value Under Utah's Recording Act. 
Because the vendor purchase money priority rule is subject to the operation of the 
recording act, the first issue that must be decided by this Court is whether Defendant is entitled to 
the protection of Utah's recording act as a bona fide purchaser for value. Utah is a "race-notice" 
jurisdiction under which a person acquiring an interest in property does so subject to matters of 
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which he has actual notice, as well as matters of winch he is deemed to have notice (i.e., 
"constructive notice"), See Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-3402403 (2010). Stated differently, a party 
who acquires real property for value witliout actual or constructive notice of any interest against 
his predecessor's title, does so free of said interests as a bona fide purchaser for value. In this 
case, Plaintiff offers no evidence that Defendant had actual knowledge that Plaintiff or its 
predecessor claimed an interest in the property. Hence, the question for the Court is whether 
Defendant had constructive notice that the priority between the FFFC trust deed and the Phalen 
trust deed was other than reflected by the order of the recording of the documents. See e.g., 
Anderson v. American savings & Loan Assn., 668 P.2d 1253, 1254 (Utah 1983) (holding that 
"[u]nder our recording act, priority is given to that document which is recorded before another 
that asserts the same interest") 
There are two types of constructive notice under Utah law: 
One kind of constructive notice is notice which results from a record or 
which is imparted by the recording statutes; and the other is notice which 
is presumed because of the fact that a person has knowledge of certain 
facts which should impart to him, or lead him to, knowledge of the 
ultimate fact. 
First American Title Ins. Co. v. /. B. Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 837 (Utah 1998). 
The first kind of constructive notice, often referred to as "record notice," arises under the 
recording statute. The second kind of constructive notice, often referred to as "inquiry 
notice/* occurs "when circumstances arise that should put a reasonable person on guard 
so as to require further inquiry on his part/' Id. Importantly, the Utah Supreme Court has 
ruled that "inquiry notice" cannot arise from recorded documents. Id. at 838. It only 
arises if the purchaser has actual knowledge of circumstances that give rise to the duty of 
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further inquiry. Id. Since Plaintiff offers no evidence that Defendant had personal 
knowledge of any off-record circumstances that should have put him "on guard" so as to 
inquire further as to possible claims under the Phalen trust deed, the only inquiry left for 
the Court under a bona-fide-purchaser-for-value analysis is whether the documents on 
record (i.e., the warranty deed from the Phalens to the Boecks, the FFFC trust deed, and 
the Phalen trust deed) put Defendant on constructive notice that the priority of the Phalen 
trust deed vis-a-vis the FFFC trust deed was not as reflected in the order of recording. 
However, on this point, there is nothing contained in these documents that provides 
constructive notice to Defendant that the Phalen trust deed was not extinguished by the 
foreclosure of the prior-recorded FFFC trust deed, but instead remained a lien on the property 
under the vendor purchase money priority rule. As stated above, Utah law does not hold this rule 
out to be immutable. Instead, Utah law holds that the application of the vendor purchase money 
priority rule "depends upon the circumstances of the given case, the equities, and the effect of the 
recording act." Kemp, 470 P.2d at 393. Accordingly, Defendant could not know whether the 
Phalen trust deed took priority under the vendor purchase money mortgage rule unless he 
undertook further inquiiy into the circumstances surrounding the original transaction between the 
Phalens and the Boecks. However, as already established, parties are entitled to rely on the order 
of recording. Under Utah law, there is no duty of inquiry based on record notice. As a result, no 
genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Defendant's status as a bona fide purchaser for 
value, Defendant purchased the property for valuable consideration without actual or 
constructive notice of Plaintiff s claim to priority as a vendor purchase money mortgage holder. 
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III. Conclusion 
Because no genuine issue exists as to whether Defendant was a bona fide purchaser for value, 
Defendant is entitled to talce the property free of all other interests. Therefore, the Court grants 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment, 
However, the Court denies Defendant's request for an award of attorneys' fees under 
Utah Code Ann, § 78B-5-S26 (2010). "Whether attorney fees should be awarded under Utah 
Code section 78B-5-826 is a separate policy-driven analysis subject to the court's discretion." 
Hooban v. Unicity Int 7, Inc., 220 P.3d 485, 488 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 2009), cert granted, 225 
P.3d 880 (Utah 2010), The Utah Supreme Court has explained that the policy behind Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-5-826 is "to *creat[e] a level playing field' for parties to a contractual dispute," 
Bilanzich v. LonettU 160 P.3d 1041,1046 (Utah 2007) (citation omitted). Here, Defendant is not 
an original party to the Phalen trust deed or the corresponding trust deed note. Consequently, the 
Court finds that the policy behind Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 of "creating a level playing 
field" between contractual parties would not be served by awarding Defendant attorneys' fees in 
this case, 
This Ruling constitutes the final order of the Court. 
DATED this 3^ day of November, 2010. 
W. Brent West 
District Court Judge 
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299 South Main Street, 13lh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Rodger ML Burdge 
Pan* Brown Gee & Loveless, P.C. 
Counsel for Defendant 
185 South State Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-3-103) 
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§ 57-3-103. Effect of failure to record, UT ST § 57-3-103 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 57. Real Estate 
Chapter 3. Recording of Documents (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
U.C.A. 1953 § 57-3-103 
§ 57-3-103. Effect of failure to record 
Currentness 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any subsequent purchaser of the same real property, 
or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 
Credits 
Laws 1988, c. 155, § 15; Laws 1989, c. 88, § 9; Laws 1998, c. 61, § 3, eff. July 1, 1998. 
Codifications R.S. 1898, § 2001; C.L. 1907, § 2001; C.L. 1917, § 4901; R.S. 1933, § 78-3-3; C. 1943, § 78-3-3; C. 1953, 
§ 57-3-3. 
Notes of Decisions (35) 
Current through 2011 Second Special Session. 
End of Document © 2011 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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ADDENDUM "C" 
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§ 78B-5-826. Attorney fees-Reciprocal rights to recover attorney fees, UT ST § 78B-5-826 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
Chapter 5. Procedure and Evidence 
Part 8. Miscellaneous (Refs & Annos) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-5-826 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-27-56.5 
§ 78B-5-826. Attorney fees—Reciprocal rights to recover attorney fees 
Currentness 
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written 
contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other 
writing allow at least one party to recover attorney fees. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 858, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
Notes of Decisions (21) 
Current through 2011 Second Special Session. 
End of Document €> 201 i Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
WestlewNe^r © 2011 Thomson Reuters, No claim to original U.S. Government Works 
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Ronald G.Russell (4134) 
Rodger M.Burge (8582) 
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS, P.C. 
185 South State Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Fax:(801)532-7750 
Attorneys for Defendant and Couterclaimant 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 









INSIGHT ASSETS, INC.; and W. ANDREW 
MCCULLOUGH, 
Counterclaim-Defendants. 
FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Civil No. 090908263 
Judge W. Brent West 
WHEREAS, by the Ruling of the Court dated November 3, 2010, attached as Exhibit 
2Qio DEC n p 3-. uq 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
"A," the Court granted counterclaimant Homero Farias5 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
on Count I of his Counterclaim, and denied Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (the 
"Summary Judgment Ruling"); and 
WHEREAS, the parties have filed a Stipulated Motion for Order of Dismissal With 
Prejudice of Counts II and III of Farias' Counterclaim (the "Motion to Dismiss"), which claims 
constitute the remaining claims of the parties in this matter; 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS 
FOLLOWS: 
1. For reasons set forth in the Summary Judgment Ruling, JUDGMENT is entered in 
favor of Homero Farias on Count of his Counterclaim. Accordingly, the Court finds and declares 
that defendants have no interest in or to the following real property located in Weber County, 
Utah (the "Property"), under that certain Trust Deed, executed by William and Roberta Boeck, 
recorded on April 22, 2004 as Entry No. 2026214, or otherwise, and thus title to the Property is 
hereby quieted in favor of Homero Farias: 
PART OF LOT 3, BLOCK 4, SOUTH OGDEN SURVEY, WEBER COUNT, 
UTAH, AND PART OF VACATED PORTION OF MADISION AVENUE 
DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: BEGINNING AT A POINT 400 FEET NORTH 
OF THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF LOT 2, BLOCK 4, AND RUNNING 
THENCE WEST 75 FEET, THENCE NORTH 50 FEET, THENCE EAST 94.5 
FEET, THENCE SOUTH 50 FEET, THENCE WEST 19.5 FEET TO THE 
PLACE OF BEGINNING 
Situated in WEBER County 
Parcel Identification Number: 04-032-0022 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2. Based upon the Motion to Dismiss, Counts II and III of the Counterclaim are 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
3. By this Final Judgment and Order, all claims of the parties are hereby adjudicated, 
and this Final Judgment and Order thus constitutes the final judgment of the Court for purposes 
of Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ENTERED this ^ day of Pttftrfv^ 2010. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge W. Brent West 
Second Judicial District Court 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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THE LAW OFFICES OF KELLY ANN BOOTH 
By:_ 
elly Ann Booth 
ttorneys for Plaintiff 
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WARRANTY DEED 
JOSEPH A. PHALEN AND DENISE R. PHALEN 
ofOGDEN, County oWEBER , State 01UT 
hereby CONVEYS and WARRANTS to 
Grantor, 
WILLIAM J . BOECK and ROBERTA BOECK , HUSBAND AND WIFE 
Grantee, 
OfOGDEN, County otoEBER , State ol),T for the sum of TEN DOLLARS and other good and valuable 
consideration, the following tract of land/tfftBER , State Q1UT, to-wit 
PART OF LOT 3, BLOCK 4. SOUTH OQDEN SURVEY, WEBER COUNTY, UTAH, AND PART 
OF VACATED PORTION OF MADISON AVENUE DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: BEGINNING AT 
A POINT 400 FEET NORTH OF THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF LOT 2, BLOCK 4, AND 
RUNNING THENCE WEST 75 FEET, THENCE NORTH 50 FEET, THENCE EAST 94.5 FEET. 
THENCE SOUTH BO FEET, THENCE WEST 19.5 FEET TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING 
04-032-0022 
^ 
Subject to easements, restrictions and rights of way appeari&§rt5f recorded enforceable in law and subject to 
2004axes and thereafter. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor, thifcSthday ofAp(il 
C M ^ * 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
On the19thday of April 2004 personally appeared brftoh 
PHfttettgner(s) of the within instrument, who duly/acknbwled 
PH A(PH^LEN[and DENISE R, 
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DEED OF TRUST 
DBFiNiTIONS 
Words used in muldple secdons of this document are defined below and other words are defined in 
Secdons 3, 11, 13, 18, 20 and 2l« Certain rules regarding the usage of words used in this document are 
also provided in. Section 16, 
_(A)_!!Sec^rity-Inst l^ment,-, means this documettt,_which. is dated ~ 
together with all Riders to this document. 
(B) "Borrower" is 
ROBERTA BQECK 
, and WILLIAM J . BOECK, wife and husband 
A p r i l . 15,. ..2Q.Q.4-
Borrower is the trustor under this Security Instrument. 
(Q "Lender" is 
F i r s t Franklin Fiijaxicial Co^p*, subsidiary of National City Bank o£ Indiana 
Lender is a Corporation 
organized and existing under the laws of Delaware 
UTAH-Single family-Fannia Mao/FrBddio Mac UNIFORM INSTRUMENT Form 3045 1/01 
^-6(UT) taooB) 
PAflA 1 of 15 Initiate! 
VMP MORTGAGE FORMS - <a00]621-729t 
Document # L074UT 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Lender'saddressis 2150 Horth F i r s t S t . , 
San J o s e , CA $5131 
Lender is the beneficiary under this Security Instrument. 
(D) "Trustee" is U3 T I T L S 
(E) "Note" means the promissory note signed by Borrower and dated A p r i l 1 9 , 2004 
The Note states that Borrower owes Lender 
SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND fc 0 0 / 1 0 0 DOllarS 
(U ,S. $ 7 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) plus interest- Borrower has promised to pay this debt in regular Periodic 
Payments atid to pay the debt in full not later than May F i r s t , 2034 
(F) "Property" means the property that is described below under the heading "Transfer of Rights in the 
Property." 
(G) "Loan" means the debt evidenced by the Note, plus interest, any prepayment charges and late charges 
due under the Note, and all sums due under this Security Instrument, plus interest. 
(11) "Riders" means all Riders to this Security Instrument that are executed by Borrower. The following 
Riders are to be executed by Borrower [check box as applicable]: 
Adjustable Rate Rider 
Balloon Rider 
VA Rider 
I I Condominium Rider 
I I Planned Unit Development Rider 
L_J Biweekly Payment Rider 
Second Home Rider 
1-4 Family Rider 
LxJ Other(s) [specify] 
Prepayment: R idar 
(J) "Applicable Law" means all controlling applicable federal, state and local statutes, regulations, 
ordinances and administradve rules and orders (that have the effect of law) as well as all applicable final, 
non-appealable judicial opinions, 
(J) "Community Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments" means all dues, fees, assessments and other 
charges that am imposed on Borrower or the Property by a condominium association, homeowners 
association or similar organization, 
~(K)~"Elertronic~Fuuds~ Transfer"- means" any transfer of" fuiufcr other than'sf traniwction~OTigtttatcd" by" 
check, draft, or similar paper instrument, which is initiated through an electronic terminal, telephonic 
instrurnenl, computer, or magnetic tape so as to order, instruct, or authorize a financial insdtutum to debit 
or credit an account. Such term includes, but is not limited to, point-of-sale transfers, automated teller 
machine transactions, transfers initiated by telephone, wire transfers, and automated clearinghouse 
transfers. 
(L) "Escrow Items" means those items that are described in Section 3. 
(M) "Miscellaneous Proceeds" means any compensation, settlement, award of damages, or proceeds paid 
by any third party (other than insurance proceeds paid under the coverages described in Section 5) for: (i) 
damage to, or destruction of, the Property; (ii) condemnation or other taking of all or any part of the 
Property; (iii) conveyance in lien of condemnation; or (iv) rmsrepresentations of, or omissions as to, the 
value and/or condition of the Property. 
(N) "Mortgage Insurance" means insurance protecting Lender against the nonpayment of, or default on, 
the Loan. 
(O) "Periodic Payment" means die regularly scheduled amount due for (i) principal and interest under the 
Note, plus (ii) any amounts under Section 3 of this Security Instrument. 
(P) "RESPA11 means the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (12 U.S.C. Section 2601 et seq.) and Its 
iinplementkig regulation, Regulation X (24 C.F.R. Part 3500), as they might be amended from time to 
time, or any additional or successor legislation or regulation that governs die same subject matter. As used 
in this Security Instrument, "RSSPA" refers to all requirements and restrictions that are hrrposed in regard 
/•ft <rvfo 
B(UT)(OOOM paflajflfiB Form 3045 1/01 
Document # LQ751T2 
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to a "federally related mortgage loan" even if the Loan does not qualify as a "federally related mortgage 
loan" under RESPA, 
(Q) "Successor in Interest of Borrower" means any party that has taken title to the Property, whether or 
not that party has assumed Borrowers obligations under the- Note and/or this Security Instrument. 
TRANSFER OF RIGHTS IN THE PROPERTY 
This Security Instrument secures to Lender: (i) the repayment of the Loan, and all renewals, extensions and 
modifications of the Note; and (ii) die performance of Borrower's covenants and agreements under this 
Security Instrument and the Note. For this purpose> Borrower irrevocably grants, conveys and warrants to 
Trustee, in trust, with power of sale, me following described property located in the 
c o u n t y of Weber : 
ITypc of Recording Jurisdiction! [Name of According Jurisdiction] 
Legal Descript ion attached hereto and made a part hereof 
Prepayment; Rider attached hereto and made a part hereof 
Tax Serial Number: Q4-032-Q022 _ . _. . . _ .wH.ch_currenilyJias.dic address.of_ 
2915 MADISON AVENUE [Street] 
OGDBN .Cilyl.Utah 84403 [Zip Code] 
("Property Address"): 
TOGETHER WITH all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property^ and all 
easements, appurtenances, and fixtures now or hereafter a part of die property. All replacements and 
additions shall also be covered by this Security Instrument. All of the foregoing is referred to in this 
Security Instrument as the "Property." 
BORROWER- COVENANTS that-Borrower is lawfully- seised of-thc- estate hereby conveyed and has-
the right to grant, convey and warrant the Property and that the Property is unencumbered, except for 
eiicumbrances of record. Bonower further warrants and will defend generally the title to the Property 
against all claims and demands, subject to any encumbrances of record. 
THIS SECURITY INSTRUMENT combines -uniform covenants for national use and non-uniform 
covenants with limited variations by jurisdiction to constitute a uniform security instrument covering real 
property. 
UNIFORM COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender covenant and agree as follows: 
1« Payment of Principal, Interest, Escrow. Items, Prepayment Charges, and Late Charges* 
Borrower shall pay when due die principal of, and interest on, the debt evidenced by die Note and any 
prepayment charges and late charges due under the Note. Borrower shall also pay funds for Escrow Items 
pursuant to Section 3* Payments due under the Note and this Security Instrument shall be made in U.S. 
rtKfa-eiuTl (oaoEi paga3o!is Form 3045 1/01 
Document ** L076UT 
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currency. However, if any check or other instrument received by Lender as payment under the Note or this 
Security Instrument is returned to Lender unpaid, Lender may require that any or all subsequent payments 
due under the Note and this Security Instrument he made in one or more of the following rbnns, as 
selected by Lender: (a) cash; (b) money order; (c) certified check, bank check, treasurer's check or 
cashier's check, provided any such check is drawn upon an institution whose deposits are insured by a 
federal agency* instrumentality, or entity; or (d) Electronic Funds Transfer. 
Payments are deemed received by Lender when received at the location designated in the Note or at 
such other location as may be designated by Under in accordance with the notice provisions in Section 15. 
Lender may return any payment or partial payment if the payment or partial payments are insufficient to 
bring the Loan current. Lender may accept any payment or partial payment insufficient to bring the I,oan 
current, without waiver of any rights hereunder or prejudice to its rights to refuse such payment or partial 
payments in the future, but Lender is not obligated to apply such payments at the time such payments are 
accepted. If each Periodic Payment is applied as of its scheduled due date, then Lender need not pay 
interest on unapplied funds. Lender may hold such unapplied funds until Borrower makes payment to bring 
the Loan current. If Borrower does not do so within a reasonable period of time, Lender- shall either apply 
such funds or return them to Borrower. If not applied earlier, such funds will be applied to the outstanding 
principal balance under the Note immediately prior to foreclosure. No offset or claim which Borrower 
might have now or in the future agaitist Lender shall relieve Borrower from making payments due under 
the Note and this Security Instrument or performing the covenants and agreements secured by this Security 
Instrument. 
2, Application of Payments or Proceeds. Except as otherwise described in this Section 2, all 
payments accepted and applied by Lender shall be applied in the following order of priority: (a) interest 
due under the Note; (b) principal due under the Note; (c) amounts due under Section 3. Such payments 
shall be applied to each Periodic Payment in the order in which it became due. Any remaining amounts 
shall be applied first to late charges, second to any odier amounts due under this Security Instrument, and 
then to reduce the principal balance of the Note. 
If Lender receives a payment from Borrower for a delinquent Periodic Payment which includes a 
sufficient amount to pay any late charge due, the payment may be applied to the delinquent payment and 
the-late- charge.-!* more-than one-Periodic- Payment is oatstandingT Lender- may- apply any payment rcceived-
from Borrower to the repayment of the Periodic Payments if, and to the extent that, each payment can be 
paid in full. To the extent that any excess exists after the payment is applied to the full payment of one or 
more Periodic Payments, such excess may be applied to any late charges due. Voluntary prepayments sluill 
be applied first to any prepayment charges and then as described in the Note. 
Any application of payments, insurance proceeds, or Miscellaneous Proceeds to principal due under 
the Note shall not extend or postpone the due date, or change the amount, of the Periodic Payments. 
3. Funds for Escrow Items. Borrower shall pay to Lender on the day Periodic Payments are due 
under the Note, until the Note is paid in mil, a Sum (thus "Funds") to provide for payment of amounts due 
for: (a) taxes and assessments and other items which can attain priority over this Security Instrument as a 
lien or encumbrance on the Property; (b) leasehold payments or ground rents on the Property, if any; (c) 
premiums for any and all insurance required by Lender under Section 5; and (d) Mortgage Insurance 
premiums, if any, o* any sums payable by Borrower to Lender in lieu of the payment of Mortgage 
Insurance premiums in accordance with the provisions of Section 10. These items are called "Escrow 
Items." At origination or at any time during the term of the Loan, Lender may require that Community 
Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments, if any, be escrowed by Borrower, and such dues, fees and 
assessments shall bo an Escrow item. Borrower shall promptly furnish to Lender all notices of amounts to 
be paid under this Section. Borrower shall pay Lender the Funds for Escrow Items unless Lender waives 
Borrower's obligation to pay the Funds for any or all Escrow Items. Lender may waive Borrower's 
obligation to pay to Lender Funds for any or all Escrow Items at any time. Any such waiver may only be 
Initial* 
|JPb-6(UT) iiiOOS) Peg«4oti$ Form 3045 1/01 
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in writing. In the event of such waiver, Borrower shall pay directly, when and where payable, the amounts 
due for any Escrow Items for which payment of Funds has been waived by Lender and, if Lender requires, 
shall furnish to Lender receipts evidencing such payment within such time period as Lender may require. 
Borrower's obligation to make such payments and to provide receipts shall for all purposes be deemed to 
be a covenant and agreement contained in this Security Instrument, as the phrase "covenaut and agreement" 
is used in Section 9. If Borrower is obligated to pay Escrow Items directly, pursuant to a waiver, and 
Borrower fails to pay die amount due tot an Escrow Item, Lender may exercise its rights under Section 9 
and pay such amount and Borrower shall then be obligated under Section 9 to repay to Lender any such 
amount. Lender may revoke the waiver as to any or all Escrow Items at any time by a notice given in 
accordance with Section 15 and, upon such revocation, Borrower shall pay to Lender all Funds, and in 
such amounts, that are then required under this Section 3 . 
Lender may, at any time, collect and hold Funds in an amount (a) sufficient to permit Lender to apply 
the Funds at the time specified under RESPA, and (b) not to exceed the maximum amount a lender can 
requite under RESPA. Lender shall estimate the amount of Funds due on the basis of current data and 
reasonable estimates of expenditures of future Escrow Items or otherwise in accordance with Applicable 
Law. 
The Fwids shall be held in an institution whose deposits are insured by a federal agency, 
instrumeniality, or entity (including Lender, if Lender is an institution whose deposits are so insured) or in 
any Federal Home Loan Bank. Lender shall apply the Funds to pay the Escrow Items mi later than the time 
specified under RESPA, Lender shall not charge Borrower for holding and applying the Funds, annually 
analysing the escrow account, or verifying the Escrow Items, unless Lender pays Borrower interest on the 
Funds and Applicable Law permits Lender to make such a charge. Unless an agreement is made in writing 
or Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on the Funds, Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower 
any interest or earnings on the Funds. Borrower and Lender can agree in writing, however, that interest 
shall be paid on the Funds. Lender shall give to Borrower, without charge, an annual accounting of the 
Funds as required by RESPA, 
If there is a surplus of Funds held in escrow, as defined under RESPA, Lender shall account to 
Borrower for the excess funds in accordance with RESPA. If there is a shortage of Funds held in escrow, 
. as defined-undcr-RESPAr-Lcudcr-shall-rtotify-Borrower- as required by-RESPAT and Borrower- shall-pay- to-
Lender die amount necessary to make up the shortage in accordance with RESPA, hut in no more than 12 
monthly payments. IF there is a deficiency of Funds held in escrow, as defined under RESPA, Lender shall 
notify Borrower as required by RESPA, and Borrower shall pay to Lender die amount necessary to make 
up the deficiency in accordance with RJ&SPA, but in no TWTC than 12 monthly payments. 
Upon payment in full of all sums secured by uiis Security Instrument, Lender shall promptly refund 
to Borrower any Funds held by Lender. 
4, Charges; Liens, Borrower shall pay all taxes, assessments, charges, fines, and impositions 
attributable to the Property which can attain priority over this Security Instrument, leasehold payments or 
pouMTe^snbXtlie^PrcjpcTtyrtf 
the extent that these items are Escrow Items, Borrower shall pay them in the manner provided in Section 3. 
Borrower shall promptly discharge any lien which has priority over this Security Instrument unless 
Borrower: (a) agrees in writing to the payment of the obligation secured by the lien in a manner acceptable 
to Lender, but only so long as Borrower is performing such agreement; (b) contests the lien in good faidi 
by, or defends against enforcement of die lien in, legal proceedings which in Lender's opinion operate to 
prevent the enforcement of the lien while those proceedings are pending, but only until such proceedings 
are concluded; or (c) secures from die holder of the lien an agreement satisfactory to Lender subordinating 
die Hen to this Security Instrument. If Lender determines that any part of the Property is subject to a lien 
which can attain priority over this Security Instrument, Lender may give Borrower a notice identifying the 
<fflft>-eruTi iQoosi Pag>soM« Form 3045 1/01 
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lien. Within 10 days of the date on which that notice is given. Borrower shall satisfy the lien or take one or 
more of the actions set forth above in this Section 4. 
Lender may require Borrower to pay a one-time charge for a real estate tax verification and/or 
reporting service used by Lender in connection with this Loan. 
5. Property Insurance. Borrower shall keep the improvements now existing or hereafter erected on 
the Property insured against loss by fire, hazards included within the term "extended coverage/' and any 
other hazards including, but not limited to, earthquakes and floods, for which Lender requires insurance. 
This insurance shall be maintained in the amounts (including deductible levels) and for the periods that 
Lender requires. What Lender requires pursuant to the preceding sentences can change during die term of 
die Loan. The insurance carrier providing the insurance shall be chosen by Borrower subject to Lender's 
right to disapprove Borrower's choice, which right shall not be exercised unreasonably, Lender may 
require Borrower to pay, in connection with this Loan, either: (a) a one-time charge for flood zone 
deteraiination> certification and tracking services; or (b) a one-time charge for flood zone determination 
and certification services and subsequent charges each time remappings or similar changes occur which 
reasonably might affect such determination or certification. Borrower shall also be responsible for the 
payment of any fees imposed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in connection with the 
review of any flood zone determination resulting from an objection by Borrower. 
If Borrower fails to maintain any of die coverages described above, Lender may obtain insurance 
coverage, at Lender's option and Borrower's expense. Lender is under no obligation to purchase any 
particular type or amount of coverage. Therefore, such coverage shall cover Lender, but might or might 
not protect Borrower, Borrower's equity in the Property, or the contents of the Property, against any risk, 
hazard or liability and might provide greater or lesser coverage than was previously in ctTcct. Borrower 
acknowledges that the cost of the insurance coverage so obtained might significantly exceed die cost of 
insurance that Borrower could have obtained* Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this Section 5 shall 
"become additional debt of Borrower secured by this Security Bwtrumeut. These amounts shall hear interest 
at the Note rate from the date of disbursement and shall be payable, with such interest, upon notice from 
Lender to Borrower requesting payment. 
All insurance policies required by Lender and renewals of such policies shall be subject to Lenders 
right-to-disapprove -such-policiesv- snail-include- a standard- mortgage- clause.-and- shall-name- Lender- a s -
mortgagee and/or as an additional toss payee. Lender shall have the right to hold the policies and renewal 
certificates. If Lender requires, Borrower shall promptly give to Lender all receipts of paid premiums and 
renewal nodces. If Borrower obtains any form of insurance coverage, not otherwise required by Lender, 
for damage to, or destruction of, the Property, such policy shall include a standard mortgage clause and 
shall name Lender as mortgagee and/or as an additional loss payee. 
In the event of loss, Borrower shall give prompt notice to the insurance carrier and Lender, Lender 
may make proof of loss if not made prompdy by Borrower. Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree 
in writing, any insurance proceeds, whether or not the underlying insurance was required by Lender, shall 
"be applied to restoration or rL^aiFoTffi^Property, ifthe restoration or repaiFis economiclilly"feasible_ana~ 
Lender's security is not lessened. During such repair and restoration period. Lender shall have the right to 
hold such insurance proceeds until Lender has had an opportunity to inspect such Property to ensure die 
work has been completed to Lender's satisfaction, provided that such inspection shall be undertaken 
promptly. Lender may disburse proceeds for the repairs and restoration in a single payment or in a series 
of progress payments as the work is completed. Unless an agreement is made in writing or Applicable Law 
requires interest to be paid on such insurance proceeds, Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower any 
interest or earnings on such proceeds. Fees for public adjusters, or other third parties, retained by 
Borrower shall not be paid out of the insurance proceeds and shall be the sole obligation of Borrower. If 
the restoration or repair is not economically feasible or Lender's security would be lessened, the insurance 
proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with 
djJ&-8(UT] (OOOBJ p»<ja6oM6 Form 3046 1/01 
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the excess, if any, paid to Borrower. Such insurance proceeds shall be applied in the order provided for in 
Section 2. 
If Borrower abandons the Property
 4 Lender may file, negotiate and settle any available insurance 
claim and related matters. If Borrower does not respond within 30 days to a notice from Lender that the 
insurance earner has offered to settle a claim, then lender may negotiate and settle the claim. The 30-day 
period will begin when the notice is given. In either event, or if Lender acquires the Property under 
Section 22 or otherwise, Borrower hereby assigns to Lender (a) Borrower's rights to any. insurance 
proceeds in an amount not to exceed the amounts unpaid under the Note or this Security Instrument, and 
(b) any other of Borrower's rights (other than the right to any refund of unearned premiums paid by 
Borrower) under all insurance policies covering the Property, insofar as such rights are applicable to the 
coverage of the Property. Lender may use the insurance proceeds either to repair or restore the Property or 
to pay amounts unpaid under the Note or this Security Instrument, whether or not then due. 
6> Occupancy. Borrower shall occupy, establish, and use the Property as Borrower's principal 
residence within 60 days after the execution of this Security Instrument and shall continue to occupy the 
Property as Borrower's principal residence for at least one year after the date of occupancy, unless Lender 
otherwise agrees in writing, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, or unless extenuating 
circumstances exist which are beyond Borrower's control. 
7, Preservation, Maintenance and Protection of the Property; Inspections. Borrower shall not 
destroy% damage or impair the Property, allow the Property to deteriorate or commit waste on die 
Property. Whether or not Borrower is residing in die Property, Borrower shall maintain the Property in 
order to prevent the Property from deteriorating or decreasing in value due to its condition. Unless it is 
determined pursuant to Section 5 that repair or restoration is not economically feasible, Borrower shall 
prompdy repair the Property if damaged to avoid further deterioration or damage. If insurance or 
condemnation proceeds are paid in connection with damage to, or die taking of, the Property, Borrower 
shall be responsible for repairing or restoring the Property only if Lender lias released proceeds for such 
purposes. Lender may disburse proceeds for the repairs and restoration in a single payment or in a series of 
progress payments as the work is completed, If the insurance or condemnation proceeds are not sufficient 
to tepair or restore the Property, Borrower is not relieved of Borrower's obligation for die completion of 
- such repair- or-restoration 
Lender or its agent may make reasonable entries upon and inspections of the Property. If it has 
reasonable cause, Lender may inspect the interior of the improvements on the Property. Lender shall give 
Borrower notice at the time of or prior to such an interior inspection specifying such reasonable cause. 
8* Borrower's Loan Application. Borrower shall be in default if, during the Loan application 
process, Borrower or any persons or entities acting at the direction of Borrower or whh Borrower's 
knowledge or consent gave materially false, misleading, or inaccurate infoTTnatJon or statements to Lender 
(or failed to provide Lender widi material information) in connection with the Loan. Material 
representations include, but are not limited to, representations concerning; Borrower's occupancy of the 
"Property as Boirower'rpmcipdTe^dence; 
9. Protection oF Lender's Interest in the Property and Rights Under this Security Instrument. If 
(a) Borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained in this Security Instrument, (b) mere 
is a legal proceeding that might significantly affect Lender's interest in the Property and/or rights under 
this Security Instrument (such as a proceeding in bankruptcy, probate, for condemnation or forfeiture, for 
enforcement of a lien which n)ay attain priority over this Security Instrument or to enforce laws OT 
regulations), or (c) Borrower has abandoned the Property, then Lender may do and pay for whatever is 
reasonable or appropriate to protect Lender'9 interest in the Property and rights under this Security 
Instrument, including protecting and/or assessing the value of the Property, and securing and/or repairing 
the Property. Lender's actions can include, but are not limited to: (a) paying any sums secured by a lien 
which has priority over this Security instrument; (b) appearing in court; and (c) paying reasonable 
Hfctt Pfo W 
igfr-BlUTI (OOQ61 P^a7ofiB Form 3045 1701 
Document # LOS OUT 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
E# 2 0 2 6 2 1 3 PG 8 OF 17 
attorneys' fees to protect its interest in the Property and/or rights under this Security Instrument, including 
its secured position in a hankraptcy proceeding. Securing the Property includes, but is not limited to, 
entering the Property to inake repairs, change locks, replace or board up doors and windows, drain water 
from pipes, eliminate building or other code, violations or dangerous condition^ and have utilities turned 
on or off. Although Lender may take action under this Section 9, Lender does not have to do so and is not 
under any duty or obligation to do so. It is agreed that Lender incurs no liability for not taking any or alt 
actions authorized under this Section 9. 
Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this Section 9 shall become additional debt of Borrower 
secured by this Security Instrument. These amounts shall bear interest at the Note rate from the date of 
disbursement and shall be payable, with such interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower requesting 
payment. 
If this Security Instrument is on a leasehold, Borrower shall comply with all the provisions of the 
lease. If Borrower acquires fee title to the Property, the leasehold and the fee tide shall not merge unless 
Lender agrees to the merger in writing. 
10, Mortgage Insurance* If Lender required Mortgage Insurance as a condition of making the Loan, 
Borrower shall pay the premiums required to maintain the Mortgage Insurance in effect. If, for any reasou, 
the Mortgage Insurance coverage required by Lender ceases to be available from the mortgage insurer diat 
previously provided such insurance and Borrower was required to make separately designated payments 
toward the ptemiums for Mortgage Insurance* Borrower shall pay the premiums required to obtain 
coverage substantially equivalent to the Mortgage Insurance previously in effect, at a cost substantially 
equivalent to the cost to Borrower of the Mortgage Insurance previously in effect, from an alternate 
.mortgage insurer selected by Lender. If substantially equivalent Mortgage Insurance coverage is not 
available, Borrower shall continue to pay to Lender the amount of the separately designated payments diat 
were due when the insurance coverage ceased to be in effect. Lender will accept, use and retain these 
payments as a non-refundable loss reserve in lieu of Mortgage Insurance. Such loss reserve shall be 
-non-refundable, notwithstanding the fact that the Loan is ultimately paid in full, and Lender shall not be 
required, to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on such loss reserve. Lender can no longer require loss 
reserve payments if Mortgage Insurance coverage (in the amount and for the period that Lender requires) 
provided by an insurer selected by Lender again becomes available, is obtained, and Lender requires 
separately designated payments toward the premiums for Mortgage Insurance. If Lender required Mortgage 
Insurance; as a condition of making the Loan and Borrower was required to make separately designated 
payments toward the prernhims for Mortgage Insurance, Borrower shall pay the premiums required to 
-in^taiii-Mortgage-IrjSuiarice-m-effectr or-to-provide- a-non-refundable loss- reserver until-Lenders-
requirement for Mortgage Insurance ends in accordance with any written agreement between Borrower and 
Lender providing for such tennination or until termination is required by Applicable Law. Nothing in tins 
Section 10 affects Borrower's obligation to pay interest at the rate provided in the Mote. 
Mortgage Insurance reimburses Lender (or any entity that purchases the Note) for certain losses it 
may incur if Borrower does not repay the Loan as agreed. Borrower Is Hot a party to the Mortgage 
Insurance. 
Mortgage insurers evaluate their total risk on all such insurance in force from time to time, and may 
enter into agreements with other parties that share or modify their risk, or reduce losses. These agreements 
are on terms and conditions that are satisfactory to the mortgage insurer and the other party (or parties) to 
these agreements. These agreements may require the mortgage insurer to make payments using any source 
of funds that the mortgage insurer may have available (which may include funds obtained from Mortgage 
Insurance premiums). 
As a result of these agreements, Lender, any purchaser of the Note, another insurer, any reinsurer, 
any other entity, or any affiliate of any of the foregoing, may receive (directly or indirectly) amounts that 
derive from (or might be characterized as) a portion of Borrower's payments for Mortgage Insurance, in 
exchange for sharing or modifying the mortgage insurer's risk, or reducing tosses. If such agreement 
provides that an affiliate of Lender takes a share of the insurer's risk in exchange for a share of the 
premiums paid to the insurer, the arrangement is often termed "captive reinsurance." Further: 
(a) Any such agreements will not affect the amounts that Borrower has agreed to pay For 
Mortgage Insurance, or any other terms of the Loan. Such agreements will not increase the amount 
Borrower will owe for Mortgage Insurance, and they will not entitle ftornrvfer to any refund. 
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(b) Any such agreements will not affect the rights Borrower has - if any - -with respect to the 
Mortgage Insurance under the Homeowners Protection Act of 1998 or any other law. These rights 
may include the right to receive certain disclosures, to request and obtain cancellation of the 
Mortgage Insurance, to have the Mortgage Insurance terminated automatically, and/or to receive a 
refund of any Mortgage Insurance premiums that were unearned at the time of such cancellation or 
termination, 
11. Assignment of Miscellaneous Proceeds; Forfeiture. All Miscellaneous Proceeds arc hereby 
assigned to and shall be paid to Lender, 
If the Property is damaged, such Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to restoration or repair of 
the Property, if the restoration or repair is economically feasible and Lender's security is not lessened. 
During such repair and restoration period, Lender shall have the right to hold such Miscellaneous Proceeds 
until Lender has had an opportunity to inspect such Property to ensure the work has been completed to 
Lender's satisfaction, provided that such inspection shall be undertaken prompdy. Lender may pay for the 
repairs and restoration in a single disbursement or in a series of progress payments as the work is 
completed. Unless an agreement is made in writing or Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on such 
Miscellaneous Proceeds* Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower my interest or earnings on such 
Miscellaneous Proceeds. If the restoration or repair is not economically feasible or Lender's security would 
be lessened» die Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by this Security Instrument, 
whether Of riot then due, with the excess, if any, paid to Borrower. Such Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be 
applied in the order provided for in Section 2. 
In the event of a total taking, destruction, or loss in value of die Property, the Miscellaneous 
Proceeds shall be applied to the- sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with 
the excess, if any, paid to Borrower. 
In the event of a partial taking, destruction, or loss in value of the Property in which the fair market 
value of the Property immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value is equal to or 
greater than the amount of the sums secured by this Security Instrument immediately before die partial 
taking, destruction, or loss in value, unless Borrower and Lender otherwise agree in writing, the sums 
secured by this Security Instrument shall be reduced by the amount of the Miscellaneous Proceeds 
multiplied by the following fraction: (a) the total amount of the sums secured immediately before the 
partial taking, destruction, or loss in value divided by (b) the fair market value of die Property 
irninerliately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value. Any balance shall be paid to Borrower. 
In the event of a partial taking, destruction, or loss in value of the Property in which the fair market 
value-of u^-proT^rty-immediately-before-tj^ partial-takirigrdestructionrorloss-invalue-istessthandie-
amount of the sums secured irmnediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value, unless 
Borrower and Lender otherwise agree in writing, the Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to the sums 
secured by this Security Instrument whether or not the sums are then due. 
If the Property is abandoned by Borrower, or if, after notice by Lender to Borrower that the 
Opposing Party (as defined in the next sentence) offers to make an award to settle a claim for damages, 
Borrower fails to respond to Lender within 30 days after the date the notice is given, Lender is authorized 
to collect and apply t ie Miscellaneous Proceeds either to restoration or repair of the Property or to the 
sums secured by uiis Security Instrument, whether or not then due, ''Opposing Party" means the third party 
that owes Borrower Miscellaneous Proceeds or the party against whom Borrower has a right of action ii). 
regard to Miscellaneous Proceeds. 
Borrower shall be in default if any action or proceeding, whether civil or criminal, is begun that, in 
Lender's judgment, could result in forfeiture of die Property or other material impainnent of Lender's 
interest in the Property or rights under this Security Instrument. Borrower can cure such a default and, if 
• acceleration has occurred, reinstate as provided in Section 19, by causing the action Or proceeding to be 
dismissed with a ruling that, in Lender's judgment, precludes forfeiture of the Property or other material 
impairment of Lender's interest in the Property or rights under this Security Instrument. The proceeds of 
any award or claim for damages that are attributable to the impairment of Lender's interest in the Property 
are hereby assigned and shall be paid to Lender* 
All Miscellaneous Proceeds that are not applied to restoration or repair of the Property shall be 
applied in the order provided for in Section 2. 
nan* |Ufo V& 
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12. Borrower Not Released; Forbearance By Lender Not a Waiver. Extension of the time for 
payment or modification of amortization of the sums secured by this Security Itistrument granted by Lender 
to Borrower or any Successor in Interest of Borrower Shall not operate to release the liability of Borrower 
or any Successors in Interest of Borrower. Lender shall not be required to commence proceedings against 
any Successor in Interest of Borrower or to refuse to extend time for payment or otherwtee modify 
amortization of the sums secured by this Security Instrument by reason of any demand made by the original 
Borrower or any Successors in Interest of Borrower. Any forbearance by Lender in exercising any right or 
remedy including, without limitation, Lender's acceptance of payments from third persons, entities or 
Successors in Interest of Borrower or in amounts less than the amount then due, shall not be a waiver of or 
preclude the exercise of any right or remedy. 
13* Joint and Several Liability; Co-signersj Successors and Assigns Bound. Borrower covenants 
and agrees that Borrower*? obligations and liability shall be Joint and several. However, any Borrower who 
co-signs this Security Instrument but does not execute the Note (a "co-signer"): (a) is co-signing this 
Security Instrument only to mortgage, grant and convey the co-signer's interest in the Property under the 
terms of this Security Instrument; (b) is not personally obligated to pay the sums secured by this Security 
Instrument; and (c) agrees that Lender and any otfier Borrower can agree to extend, modify, forbear or 
mate any accommodations with regard to die terms of mis Security Instrument or die Note without the 
co-signer's consent. 
Subject to the provisions of Section 18, any Successor in Interest of Borrower who assumes 
Borrower's obligations under this Security Instrument in writing, and is approved by Lender, shall obtain 
all of Borrower's rights and benefits under this Security Instrument, Borrower shall not be released from 
"Borrowers obligations and liability under this Security Instrument unless Lender agrees to such release in 
writing. The covenants and agreements of this Security Instrument shall hind (except as provided in 
Section 20) and benefit the successors and assigns of Lender. 
J 4. Loan Charges. Lender may charge Borrower fees for services performed in connection with 
Borrower's default, for the purpose of protecting Lender's interest in the Property and rights under mis 
Security Instrument, including, but not limited to, attorneys7 fees, property inspection and valuation tees. 
In regard to any other fees* the absence of express authority in this Security Instrument to charge a specific 
fee to Borrower shall not be construed as a prohibition on the charging of such fee. Lender may not charge 
fees that are expressly prohibited by this Security Instrument or by Applicable Law. 
If die Loan is subject to a law which sets maximum loan charges, and that law is finally interpreted so 
that the interest or other loan charges collected or to be collected in connection with the Loan exceed the 
- • • "perMtte3~Him^ D e reduced-by the- amount-necessary- to reduce- the 
charge to the permitted limit; and (b) any sums already collected from Borrower which exceeded permitted 
limits will be refunded to Borrower. Lender may choose to make this refund by reducing the principal 
owed under the Note OT by making a direct payment to Borrower. If a refund reduces principal, the 
reduction will be treated as a partial prepayment without any prepayment charge (whether or not a 
prepayment charge is provided for under the Note). Borrower's acceptance of any such refund made by 
direct payment to Borrower will constitute a waiver of any right of action Borrower might have arising out 
of such overcharge. 
15. Notices. All notices given by Borrower or Lender in connection with this Security Instrument 
must be in writing. Any notice to Borrower in connection with this Security Instrument shall be deemed to 
have been given to Borrower when mailed by first class mail or when actually delivered to Borrower's 
notice address if sent by other means. Notice to any one Borrower shall constitute notice to alt Borrowers 
unless Applicable Law expressly requires odierwise. The notice address shall be the Property Address 
unless Borrower has designated a substitute notice address by notice to Lender. Borrower shall promptly 
notify Lender of Borrower's change of address. If Lender specifies a procedure for reporting Borrower's 
change of acWress, then Borrower shall only report a change of address through that specified procedure. 
There may be only one designated notice address under this Security Instrument at any one time. Any 
notice to Lender shall be given by delivering it or by mailing it by first class mail to Lender's address 
stated herein unless Lender has designated another address by notice to Borrower- Any notice in 
connection with this Security Instrument shall not be deemed to have been given to Lender until actually 
received by Lender. If any notice required by diis Security Instrument is also required under Applicable 
Law, the Applicable Law requirement will satisfy the corresponding requirement under thitf Security 
Instrument. 
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16, Governing Lawj Severability; Rules of Construction* This Security Instrument shall be 
governed by federal law and the law of the jurisdiction in which the Property is located* All rights and 
obligations contained in this Security Instrument are subject to any requirements and limitations of 
Applicable Law, Applicable Law might explicitly or implicitly allow the parties to agree by contract or it 
might be silent, but such silence shall not be construed as a prohibition against agreement by contract, in 
the event that any provision or clause of this Security Instrument or the Note conflicts with Applicable 
Law, such conflict shall not affect other provisions of this Security Instrument or the Note which can be 
given effect without the conflicting provision. 
As used in this Security Instrument; (a) words of the masculine gender shall mean and include 
corresponding neuter words or words of the feminine gender; (b) words in the singular shall mean and 
include the plural and vice versa; and (c) the word "may" gives sole discretion widiout any obligation to 
take any action. 
17. Borrower's Copy. Borrower shall be given one copy of the Note and of this Security Instrument. 
18- Transfer of the Property or a Beneficial Interest In Borrower. As used in this Section 18, 
"Interest in the Property" means any legal or beneficial interest in the Property, including, hut not limited 
to, those beneficial interests transferred in a bond for deed, contract for deed, installment sales contract or 
escrow agreement, the intent of which is the transfer of title by Borrower at a future date to a purchaser. 
If all or any part Of the Property or any Interest in the Property is sold or transferred (or if Borrower 
is not a natural person and a bciieficial interest in Borrower is sold or transferred) without Lender's prior 
written consent, Lender may require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this Security 
Instrument, However, this option shall not be exercised by Lender if such exercise is prohibited by 
Applicable Law. 
If Lender exercises this option, Lender shall give Borrower notice of acceleration. The notice shall 
provide a period of not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given in accordance with Section 15 
within which Borrower must pay all sums secured by this Security Instrument. If Borrower fails to pay 
these sums prior to the expiration of this period, Lender may invoke any remedies permitted by this 
Security Instrument without further notice or demand on Borrower. 
19. Borrower's Right to Reinstate After Acceleration, If Borrower meets certain conditions, 
Borrower shall have the right to have enforcement of this Security Instrument discontinued at any time 
prior to the earliest of: (a) five days before sale of the Property pursuant to any power of sale contained in 
this Security Instrument; (b) such other period as Applicable Law might specify for the termination of 
_ ..Borro.werls_right_.to_reinstate;. or_(c)_entry_i>f_aL 'lodgment enforcing this Security Instrument Those 
conditions are that Borrower: (a) pays Lender all sums which then would be due under this Security 
Instrument and the Note as if no acceleration had occurred; (b) cures any default of any other covenants or 
agreements; (c) pays all expenses incurred in enforcing this Security Instrument, including, but not limited 
to, reasonable attorneys' fees, property inspection and valuation fees, and other fees incurred for the 
purpose of protecting Lender's interest in the Property and rights under this Security Instrument; and (d) 
takes such action as Lender may reasonably require to assure that Lender's interest in the Property and 
rights under this Security Instrument, and Borrower's obligation to pay the sums secured by this Security 
Instrument, shall continue unchanged. Lender may require that Borrower pay such reinstatement sums and 
expenses in one or more of the following forms, as selected by Lender: (a) cash; (b) money order; (c) 
certified-check—bank-cheek— (ieasurer-s-GheGk-or-Gashter-s-check-provided-any-such-check-is-drawn-upon 
an institudon whose deposits are insured by a federal agency, instrumentality or entity; or (d) Electronic 
Funds Transfer, Upon reinstatement by Borrower, this Security Instrument and obligations secured hereby 
shall remain fully effective as if no acceleration had occurred. However, this right to reinstate shall not 
apply in the case of acceleration under Section, 18, 
20. Sale of Note; Change of Loan Servicer; Notice of Grievance. The Note or a partial interest in 
the Note (together with this Security Instrument) can be sold one or more times without prior notice to 
Borrower. A sale might result in a change in the entity (known as the "Loan Servicer") that collects 
Periodic Payments due under the Note and this Security Instrument and performs other mortgage loan 
servicing obligations under the Note, this Security Instrument, and Applicable Law. There also might be 
one or more changes of the Loan Servicer unrelated to a sale of the Note. If there is a change of the Loan 
Servicer, Borrower will be given written notice of the change which will state the name and address of the 
new Loan Servicer, the address to which payments should be made and any other information RESPA 
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requires in connection with a notice of transfer of servicing. If the Note is sold and thereafter the Loan is 
serviced by a Loan Servicer other than the purchaser of the Note, the mortgage loan servicing obligations 
to Borrower will remain with the Loan Servicer or be transferred to a successor Loan Servicer and are not 
assumed by the Note purchaser unless otherwise provided by the Note purchaser. 
Neither Borrower nor Lender may commence, join, or be joined to any judicial action (as either an 
individual litigant or the member of a class) that arises from the other party's actions pursuant to this 
Security Instrument or that alleges that the other party has breached any provision of. or any duty owed by 
reason of, this Security Instrument, until such Borrower or Lender has notified the other party (with such 
notice given in compliance with the requirements of Section 15) of such alleged breach and afforded the 
other party hereto a reasonable period after the giving of such notice to take corrective action. If 
Applicable Law provides a time period which must elapse before certain action can be taken, that time 
period will be deemed to be reasonable for purposes of this paragraph. The notice of acceleration and 
opportunity to cure given to Borrower pursuant to Section 22 and the notice of acceleration given to 
Borrower pursuant to Section 18 shall be deemed to satisfy the notice and opportunity to take corrective 
action provisions of this Section 20, 
21. Hazardous Substances. As used in this Section 21: (a) "Hazardous Substances" are those 
substances defined as toxic or hazardous substances, pollutants, or wastes by Environmental Law and the 
following substances: gasoline,- kerosene, other flammable or toxic petroleum products, toxic pesticides 
and herbicides, volatile solvents, materials containing asbestos or formaldehyde, and radioactive materials; 
(b) "Environmental Law" means federal laws and taws of the jurisdiction where the Property is located that 
relate to health, safety or environmental protection; (c) "Environmental Cleanup" includes any response 
action, remedial action, or removal action, as defined in Environmental Law; and (d) an "Environmental 
Condition" means a condition that can cause, contribute to, or otherwise trigger an Environmental 
Qeanup. 
Borrower shall not cause or permit the presence, use, disposal, storage, or release of any Hazardous 
Sttbstances.jQf threaten to release any Hazardous Substances, on or in flic Property. Borrower shall not do, 
nor allow anyone else to do, anything affecting the Property (a) that ¥ m notation of any Environmental 
Law. (b) which creates an Environmental Condition, or (c) which, due to the presence, use. or release of a 
Hazardous Substance, creates a condition that adversely affects the value of the Property. The preceding 
two sentences shall not apply to the presence, use, or storage on the Property of small quantities of 
Hazardous Substances that are generally recognized to be appropriate to normal residential uses and to 
maintenancer of the Property (including, but not limited to, hazardous substances in consumer products). 
Borrower shall promptly give Under written notice of (a) any investigation, claim, demand, lawsuit 
or-other-actiQ" by ™y governmental or regulatory agency or private party involving the Property and any 
Hazardous Substance or Environmental Law of which Borrower has actual knowledge, (b) any 
Environmental Condition, including but not limited to, any spilling, leaking, discharge, release or threat of 
release of any Hazardous Substance, and (c) any condition caused by the presence, use or release of a 
Hazardous Substance which adversely affects the value of the Property. If Borrower learns, or is notified 
by any governmental or regulatory authority, or any private party, that any removal or other remediation 
Of any Hazardous Substance affecting the Property is necessary, Borrower shall promptly lake all necessary 
remedial actions in accordance with Environmental Law. Nothing herein shall create any obligation on 
Lender for an Environmental Cleanup, 
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NON-UNIFORM COVENANTS* Borrower and Lender further covenant and agree as follows: 
22, Acceleration* Remedies, Lender shall gjre notice to Borrower prior to acceleration following 
Borrower's breach of any covenant or agreement in this Security Instrument, (but not prior to 
acceleration under Section 18 unless Applicable Law provides otherwise). The notice shall specify: (a) 
the default; (b) the action required to cure the default; (c) a date, not less than 30 days from the date 
the notice is given to Borrower, by which the default must be cured; and (d) that failure to cure the 
default on or before the date specified in the notice may result in acceleration of the sums secured by 
this Security Instrument and sale of the Property* The notice shall further inform Borrower of the 
rigjit to reinstate after acceleration and the rightta bring a court action to assert the non-existence of 
a default or any other defense of Borrower to acceleration and sale. If the default is not cured on or 
before the date specified in the notice, Lender at Its option may require immediate payment In full of 
all sums secured by this Security Instrument without further demand and may invoke the power of 
sale and any other remedies permitted by Applicable Law. Lender shall be entitled to collect all 
expenses incurred in pursuing the remedies provided 5n this Section 22, including, but not limited to, 
reasonable attorneys1 fees and casts of title evidence. 
If the power of sale is invoked, Trustee shall execute a written notice of the occurrence of an 
event of default and of the election to cause the Property to he sold and shall record such notice In 
each county in which any part of the Property is located. Lender or Trustee shall mall copies of such 
notice in the manner prescribed by Applicable Law to Borrower and to the other persons prescribed 
by Applicable Law. In the event Borrower does not cure the default within the period then 
prescribed by Applicable Law, Trustee shall give public notice of the sale to the persons and in the 
manner prescribed by Applicable Law- After the time required by Applicable Law, Trustee, without 
demand on Borrower, shall sell the Property at public auction to the highest bidder at the time and 
place and under the terms designated in the notice of sale in one or more parcels and in any order 
Trustee determines (but subject to any statutory right of Borrower to direct the order in which the 
Property, if consisting of several known lots or parcels, shall be sold)* Trustee may in accordance 
with Applicable Law, postpone sale of all or any parcel of the Property by public announcement at 
the time mid place of any previously scheduled sale. Lender or its designee may purchase the 
- Property at any sale;— 
Trustee shall deliver to the purchaser Trustee's deed conveying the Property without any 
covenant or warranty, expressed or implied. The recitals in the Trustee's deed shall be prima facie 
evidence of the truth of the statements made therein. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale in 
the following order, (a) to all expenses of the sale, including, but not limited to, reasonable Trustee's 
and attorneys' fees; (b) to all sums secured by this Security Instrument; and (c) any excess to the 
person or persons legally entitled to It or to the county clerk of Oi& county in which the sale took 
23* Reconveyance- Upon payment of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall 
request Trustee to reconvey the Property andlhall sunenderiu^Se^ty^^^ 
evidencing debt secured by this Security Instrument to Trustee. Trustee shall reconvey the Property 
widiout warranty to the person or persons legally entitled to it. Such person or persons shall pay any 
recordation costs. Lender may charge such person or persons a fee for reconveying the Property, but only 
if the fee is paid to a third party (such as the Trustee) for services rendered and the charging of the fee is 
perrnitted under Applicable Law. 
24. Substitute Trustee. Lender, at its opdon, may m>m time to time remove Trustee and appoint a 
successor trustee to any Trustee appointed hereunder. Without conveyance of the Property, the successor 
trustee shall succeed to all the title, power and duties conferred upon Trustee herein and by Applicable 
Law. 
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25* Request For Notices. Borrower requests that copies of the notices of default and sale be sent to 
Borrower's address which is the Property Address. 
BY SIGNING BELOWt Borrower accepts and agrees to the terms and covenants contained in this 
Security Instrument and in any Rider executed by Bonower and recorded with it. 
Wiuiesses; 
N/&-












(Seal) - (Seal) 
-Borrower 
6{UTJ IOOOS) Form304B 1701 
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STATE OF UTAH, ^V^T^ County ss: 
The foregoing instrument was subscribed and sworn to and acknowledged before me this 
by 
ROBERTA BOSCX, WILLIAM J . BOECK 
My Commission Expires: 
11-10-01 
"STQM^.IP:-
^6lUT) toOd*. Pago 16 of 15 Form 3045 1/01 
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EXHIBIT "A" E# 2026213 PC 16 OF 17 
PART OF LOT 3, BLOCK 4, SOUTH OGDEN SURVEY, WEBER COUNTY, UTAH, AND 
PART OF VACATED PORTION OF MADISON AVENUE DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT 400 FEET NORTH OF THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF LOT 2, 
BLOCK 4, AND RUNNING THENCE WEST 75 FEET, THENCE NORTH 50 FEET, 
THENCE EAST 94.5 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 50 FEET, THENCE WEST 19.5 FEET TO 
THE PLACE OF BEGINNING 
Situated in WEBER County 
Parcel Identification Number: 04-032-0022 
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PREPAYMENT RIDER 
This Prepayment Rider is made this 19th day of April , 2004 , and is mcOTponited 
into and shall be deemed to amend and supplement the Mortgage, Deed of Trust or the Security Deed (the 
"Security Instrument") of the same date given by the undersigned (the "Borrower" ) to secure Borrower's Note ( 
the "Note") to 
F i r s t Franklin Financial Corp., subsidiary of National City Bank at Indiana 
("the Lender**) of the same date and covering the property described in the Security Instrument and located at: 
2915 MADISON AVENUE, OGDEN, Utah 84403 
ADDITIONAL COVENANTS. In addition to the covenants and agreements made in the Security 
instrument, Borrower and Lender further covenant and agree as follows: 
Borrower cau make a partial prepayment at anytime without paying any charge. Borrower may make a 
full prepayment at any time Subject to a prepayment charge as follows: 
If withiri the first 3 year(s) after die date Borrower executes the Note, Sorrower makes a full 
prepayment (including prepayments occurring as a result of the acceleration of the maturity of me Note), 
Borrower must, as a condition precedent to a full prepayment, pay a prepayment charge on any amount prepaid in 
any 12 month period in excess of 20% of the unpaid balance. The prepayment charge will equal the interest that 
would accrue during a six-month period on the Excess Principal calculated at the rate of interest in effect under 
the terms of the Note at the time of the mil prepayment 
NOTICE TO BORROWER 
Rider. 
Do not sign, this loan agreement before you read it. This loan agreement provides for the 
payment of a penalty if you wish to repay the loan prior to the date provided for repayment 
in the loan agreement. 
By signing below. Borrower accepts and agrees to the terms and coverian^cpnlained^nithis Prepayment 
QBERTA BOECX WlLI 
(Seal) 
(Seal) (Seal) 
Fixed Rate and Balloon Prepayment Rider - First Lien- AZ, CA, CO, CT, DB, PL, HI, ID, 1A, LAt MT, NE, I 
I NV, NH, NY, ND, OK, OR, PA, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, WA, WY ; I 
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THLS TRUST DEED, made this 19th day of April, 2004, between 
ILLIAM J. BOECK and ROBERTA BOECK, as TRUSTOR, whose address is 2915 Madison Avenue , and U.S. TITLE OS 
'AH, INC as TRUSTEE, and 
6KPH A, PHALEN and DENISE R. PHALEN, as BENEFICIARY, 
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH POWER OR SALE, the 
lowing described property/ situated in WEBER County, State of Utah: 
3 Attached Exhibit "A" 
TOGETHER with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of way, easements, 
nts, issues, profits, income/ tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now or 
reafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and 
Lthority hereinafter given to and conferred upon Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date 
srewith, in the principal sum of $ 17,600.00, made by Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the tunes, in the 
annex and with interest as therein set forth, and with final payment due MAY 1, 2009 and any extensions and/or 
newals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment 
such additional loans or advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by 
promissory note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums expended 
pdvanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest thereon as herein provided, 
fcOVlDEDrHOWEVER; that the making of such further loans,-advances or expenditures shall be optional- with- the 
mefidary and PROVIDED FUTHER that it is the express intention of the parties to this Trust Deed that it shall stand as 
>nrinuing security until all such further loans, advances and expenditures together with interest thereon, have been paid 
.full. 
0 PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED, TRUSTOR AGREES: 
1. To keep said property continuously occupied and used, and not permit the same to become vacant, and keep said 
roperty in good condition and repair; not to remove or demolish any building thereon, to complete or restore promptty 
fid in good and workmanlike manner any building which may be constructed, damaged or destroyed thereon; to comply 
ith all laws, covenants and restrictions affecting said property; not to commit or permit waste thereof; not to commit, 
affer or permit any act upon said property in violation of law. To cultivate, irrigate, fertilize, fumigate, prune, and do all 
ther acts which from the character of said property may be reasonably necessary, the specific enumeration's herein not 
deluding the general and in the event the property is used for agricultural purposes, the Trustor will use all manure 
roduced by stock on said property as fertilizer, keep the premises free from foul and noxious weeds, brush, and other 
ndesirable growths, provide for stock selection, seed selection, crop rotation, weed control, fertilizing the soil, drainage, 
rcvention of erosion and pasture maintenance in accordance with good husbandry and the most approved methods of 
gricultural development. The Beneficiary may recover as damages for any breach of this covenant the mount it would 
ost to. put the property in condition called herein*, to do all other acts which from the character or use of said property 
nay be reasonably necessary; and, if the loan secured hereby or any part thereof is being obtained for the purpose of 
inancing construction of improvements on said property, Trustor further agrees: 
(a) T o c o m m e n c e construction promptly and to pursue s a m e w i t h reasonable di l igence to complet ion in accordance 
vith p l a n s a n d specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary, and 
(b) To allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at all times during construction. 
Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed by Beneficiary, setting forth facts showing a default by Trustor 
mder this numbered paragraph, is authorized to accept as true and conclusive all facts and statements therein, and to act 
hereon hereunder. 
2. ?o provide and maintain insurance, of such type or types and amount* as Beneficiary may require, on the 
improvements now existing or hereafter erected or placed on said property. Truster agrees to pay all premiums thereof. 
Such insurance shall be carried in companies approved by Beneficiary with loss payable clauses in favor of and in form 
acceptable to Beneficiary. In event of loss, Trustor shall give immediate notice to Beneficiary, who may make proof of 
loss, and each insurance company concerned is hereby authorized and directed to make payment for such loss directly to 
Beneficiary instead of to Trustor and Beneficiary jointly, and the insurance proceeds, ox any part thereof, may be applied 
by Beneficiary, at its option, to reduction of the indebtedness hereby secured or to the restoration or repair of the property 
damaged. Such application or release shall not cure or waive any default or notice of default hereunder or any act done 
pursuant to such notice . « 
3. To deUver to, pay for and maintain with Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured hereby \s paid m full, such 
evidence of title as Beneficiary may require, including abstracts of title or policies of title insurance and any extensions or 
renewals thereof or supplements thereto. 
4. To appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to said 
property, or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; and should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to also appear in or 
defend any such action or proceeding, to pay all costs and expenses, including cost of evidence or title and attorney's fees 
reasonable sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee, or incurred or advanced by the Beneficiary and /or Trustee in in a 
Atm Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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connection with any such action or proceeding in which the Beneficiary and/or Trustee may be joined as a party 
defendant or receives notice of such action, proceeding or claim asserted in such action, proceeding or claim asserted in 
such action or proceeding or proposed action or proceeding. Trustor covenants that the Trustor has a valid and 
unencumbered title in fee simple to the property as described herein and has the right to convey the same and warrants 
and will defend said title unto the Trustee and Beneficiary against the claims and demands of all persons whomsoever. 
5. To pay when due all taxes assessments affecting said property, including all assessments upon water company 
stock and all rents, assessments and charges for water, appurtenant to or used in connection with said property; to pay, 
when due, all encumbrances, charges, and Hens with interest on said property ot any part thereof, which at any time 
appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay all costs, fees, and expenses of this Trust. j 
6. Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein provided, then BeneficiaTy or Trustee, but : 
without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing Trustor from any 
obligation hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may deem necessary to protect 
the security hereof, Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon said property for such purposes; commence,
 ; 
appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the tights of powers of ' 
Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase, contest, or compromise any encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of ! 
either appears to be prior or superior hereto; and in exercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever • 
amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel and I 
pay his reasonable hes. \ 
7. To pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, with interest 
from date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be 
secured hereby. | 
8. In addition to the payments due in accordance with the terms of the note secured hereby, the Trustor shall, at the 
option and demand of the Beneficiary, pay each year to the Beneficiary, in equal monthly installnients, the estimated 
amount of the annual taxes, assessments, insurance premiums, maintenance and other charges upon the property, such 
sums to be held in trust by the Beneficiary for Trustor's use and benefit for payment by die Beneficiary of any such items | 
when due. The estimate shall be paid by the Beneficiary. If the beneficiary shall fail to make such an estimate, the I 
amount of the preceding annual taxes, assessments, insurance premiums, maintenance and other charges as the case may I 
be, shall be deemed to be the estimate for that year. If, however, the payments made hereunder shall not be sufficient to 
pay such charges when the same shall become due, the Trustor shall pay the Beneficiary any amount necessary to make 
up the deficiency on or before the date when the same shall become due. 
IT IS MUTUALLY AGRBED THAT: 
17 Should said^Topetry or any part: "thereof be "takenor' damaged by, reason of any public improvement or 
condemnation proceeding, or damaged by fire, OT earthquake, or in any other manner, Beneficiary shall be entitled to all 
compensation, awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its option to commence, appear in 
and prosecute in its own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compromise or settlement, in connection with 
such taking or damage. All such compensation, awards, damages, rights of aclion and proceeds, including the proceeds 
of any policies of fire and other insurance affecting said property, are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may, after 
deducting therefrom all its expenses, including attorney's fees, apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby. 
Trustor agrees to execute such further assignments of any compensation, award, damages, and rights of action and 
pToceeds-as-Beneh'ciaiy-or^rastee-may-requrrC 
2. At any time and from time to time upon written request of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and presentation of this 
Trust Deed and the note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation and retention), without affecting 
the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby, Trustee may (a) consent to the making of 
any map ox plat of said property; (b) join in granting any easement or creating any restriction thereon; (c) join in any 
subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed or the Hen or charge thereof; (d) reconvey, without warranty, 
all or any part of said property. The grantee in any reconveyance may be described as "the person or persons entitled 
thereto", and the recitals therein of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof. Trustor agrees to 
pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph. 
3. As additional security, Trustor hereby assigns Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all rents, issues, 
royalties, and profits of the property affected by this Trust Deed and of any personal property located thereon. Until 
Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any agreement 
hereunder, Trustor shall have the right to collect all such rents, issues, royalties, and profits earned prior to default as they 
become due and payable. If Trustor shall default as aforesaid, Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall cease 
and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without taking possession of the property discontinuance of Beneficiary at 
any time or from time to time to collect any such moneys shall not in any manner affect the subsequent enforcement by 
Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to collect the same. Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right 
by Beneficiary to collect, shall be, or be construed to be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor 
an assumption of liability under, nor a subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or 
option. 
4. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder, Beneficiary may at any lime without notice, either in person, by agent, or 
by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of Beneficiary as such receiver), 
and without regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby secured, enter upon and take possession 
of said property or any part thereof, in its own name sue for or otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including 
those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable 
attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may determine. 
5. The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collection of such rents, issues, and profits, or the 
proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any laking or damage of said property, and 
the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any default or notice of default hereunder or 
Invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice. 
6. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as a waiver of such 
right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent default 
7. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the 
performance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due and payable al the 
lb FA 
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ion of Beneficiary. In the event of such default, Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee to execute a written notice of 
ault and of election to cause said property to be sold to satisfy the obligations hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice 
record in each county wherein said property or some part or parcel thereof is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit 
h Trustee, the note and all documents evidencing expenditures secured hereby. 
8, After the lapse of such time as may then be required by law following the recordation of said notice of default, 
i notice of default and notice of sale having been given as then required by law, Trustee, without demand on Trustor, 
11 sell said property on the date and at the time and place designated in said notice of sale, either as a whole or in 
•aiate parcels, and in such order as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to direct the order in 
ich such property, if consisting of several known lots or parcels, shall be sold), at public auction to the highest bidder, 
purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States at the time of sale. The person conducting the sale may, 
any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to time until it shall be Completed and, in every case, 
See of postponement shall be given by public declaration thereof by such person at the time and place last appointed 
the sale; provided, if the sale is postponed for longer than one day beyond the day designated in the notice of sale, 
tice thereof shall be given in the same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver to the 
rchaser its Deed conveying said property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The 
itals in the Deed of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the tnitWuIness thereof. Any person, including 
nefidary, may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and expenses of 
seising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's fees and attorney's fees (2) cost of any 
idence of title procured in connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; (3) all sums expended 
der the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 10% per annum from date of expenditure; (4) all other 
m$ then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any, to the person or persons legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, 
its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County Clerk of the county in which the sale took 
ice. 
9. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums secured hereby 
imediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law foT the foreclosure of 
ortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceeding all costs and expenses incident 
ereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be fixed by the court. 
10. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the uffice of the County Recorder of 
ch county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From the time the 
Lbsritution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority and title of the trustee 
uned herein or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and acknowledged/ and notice thereof 
lall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law. 
llv This Trust Deed shall-apply to, inure to the-benefit of> and bind all-parries hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees, 
hninistrators, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and several. The term 
teneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured hereby, hi this Trust Deed, 
henever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the ferninine and / or neuter, and the singular number 
icludes the plural. 
12. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public record as 
rovided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other Trust Deed or of any 
tfon or proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless brought by Trustee. 
13. This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah. 
14. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale hereunder is mailed 
) him at the address herein before set forth. 
LUAMJ.BOgeK 
ROBERTA BOECK 
(If Trustor an Individual) 
STATE OF UT, COUNTY OF WEBER): ss 
RANDIULIBARM 
KOMHyFUttW^TArfOfOTW 
i u e. COUNTRY HILIS omve 
OQDiN,Ut84*0J 
CQimPUMt.'l 0-2007 
On the 19th DAY OF April, 2004, personally appeared before me WILLIAM J. BOECK and ROBERTA BOECK the signer 
of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that THEY executed the same^ 
My residence is Gfctif) i l/fr 
Commission expires 11 -10 ' (fl 
Notary Public 
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